CVE-2026-62972 in BACnet Stackinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/13/2026

BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0, lighting_command_decode in src/bacnet/lighting.c decodes its first field with the bounded apdu_size - apdu_len, but every nested decode in the operation switch is called with the original full apdu_size while the read pointer has been advanced to &apdu[apdu_len]. The leaf decoders bound their reads against the size they are told, so they read up to apdu_len bytes past the end of the caller's buffer, resulting in an out-of-bounds read. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/13/2026

The BACnet Stack is a widely utilized open-source C library designed to implement the Building Automation and Control Networks protocol for embedded systems. This stack facilitates communication between devices in smart buildings, such as HVAC controls, lighting systems, and security sensors. A critical vulnerability was identified within the core parsing logic of this library, specifically affecting versions prior to 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0. The flaw resides in the lighting_command_decode function located in the src/bacnet/lighting.c source file. This function is responsible for interpreting incoming BACnet messages related to lighting control commands, a common operation in building automation environments where precise data integrity is essential for system stability and safety.

The technical root cause of this vulnerability is an improper handling of buffer boundaries during nested protocol decoding operations. When the lighting_command_decode function processes an Application Data Unit (APDU), it initially calculates a remaining size by subtracting the current length from the total APDU size, effectively narrowing the scope for subsequent parsing steps. However, while the initial boundary check uses this reduced value, every nested decode call within the operation switch statement incorrectly utilizes the original full apdu_size as its buffer limit. Concurrently, the internal read pointer has already been advanced past the initially processed data to point at &apdu[apdu_len]. This discrepancy creates a scenario where leaf decoders believe they have access to more data than is actually available in the caller's buffer context.

This logic error results in an out-of-bounds read condition, classified under CWE-125 as Out-of-Bounds Read. Because the nested decoders bound their reads against the inflated size parameter rather than the actual remaining valid memory region, they attempt to access memory locations beyond the end of the allocated buffer. In C-based embedded systems, such memory violations can lead to information disclosure if the out-of-bounds data contains sensitive configuration details or cryptographic keys. Furthermore, depending on how the returned values from these decoders are utilized in subsequent logic flow, this vulnerability could potentially be leveraged for denial of service attacks by causing crashes due to invalid memory access patterns. The attack vector typically involves sending crafted BACnet packets that trigger the lighting command decoding path with specific length fields designed to exploit this boundary miscalculation.

From a threat intelligence perspective, this type of parsing flaw aligns with ATT&CK technique T1059, specifically sub-techniques involving command and script interpreters or system utilities if the decoded values influence execution paths, though primarily it represents an input validation failure leading to memory safety violations. The impact extends beyond simple data leakage; in critical infrastructure environments relying on BACnet for building management, such vulnerabilities can undermine the reliability of automated systems. An attacker with network access to the BACnet subnet could potentially probe system internals or destabilize connected devices by triggering these out-of-bounds reads repeatedly.

Mitigation strategies primarily involve upgrading the BACnet Stack library to patched versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, or 1.6.0 and later, where this boundary calculation logic has been corrected to ensure nested decoders respect the actual remaining buffer size rather than the original total size. For organizations unable to immediately update their dependencies, implementing network-level filtering rules can help mitigate risk by restricting BACnet traffic to trusted subnets only, thereby reducing the attack surface exposed to potential exploitation. Additionally, deploying intrusion detection systems capable of identifying anomalous packet structures in industrial control system networks may provide an additional layer of defense against attempts to exploit this parsing vulnerability.

Responsible

GitHub M

Reservation

07/15/2026

Disclosure

11/13/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00274

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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