CVE-2026-62977 in BACnet Stackinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/13/2026

BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to version 1.5.1, the BACnet FILE object implementation allows remote WriteProperty(PROP_FILE_SIZE) requests to change the size of a stream-access FILE object without checking whether that FILE is marked Read_Only. When the FILE backend is RAMFS, enlarging the file only performs realloc() and updates the stored size; the newly exposed tail region is not initialized before later reads. As a result, a remote client can enlarge a read-only RAMFS-backed stream-access FILE and then immediately retrieve the newly exposed region with AtomicReadFile(stream-access). Depending on the allocator and build configuration, the returned data may contain sanitizer fill bytes, stale heap contents, or other unintended process memory. Shrinking the file through the same path can also remotely truncate content that was intended to be read-only. This issue has been patched in versions 1.5.1 and 1.6.0.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/13/2026

The BACnet Stack is an open-source C library designed for implementing the Building Automation and Control Networks protocol on embedded systems, a critical infrastructure component often found in industrial control environments. A significant security flaw exists within the FILE object implementation of versions prior to 1.5.1, specifically concerning how stream-access files are handled during property modifications. The vulnerability arises from an insufficient access control check when processing WriteProperty requests targeting the PROP_FILE_SIZE attribute. Specifically, the stack fails to verify whether a file is designated as read-only before allowing its size to be altered by remote clients. This oversight allows any authenticated or unauthenticated actor with network access to manipulate the internal state of file objects in ways that violate their intended security policies and memory safety guarantees.

The technical core of this vulnerability lies in the interaction between property modification and memory management for RAMFS-backed files. When a client issues a request to enlarge a read-only stream-access FILE object, the system performs a realloc() operation on the underlying buffer and updates the stored size metadata without initializing the newly allocated memory region. In C programming, uninitialized heap memory contains stale data from previous allocations or process state. Consequently, when a remote actor subsequently executes an AtomicReadFile request to retrieve this expanded portion of the file, they receive raw bytes that may include sensitive information such as sanitizer fill patterns, previously freed heap contents, or other unintended process memory. This behavior constitutes a classic out-of-bounds read scenario where the application exposes internal memory states to external entities due to improper initialization practices following dynamic memory reallocation.

Beyond data leakage, this flaw also enables denial of service and integrity violations through file truncation. By shrinking the size of a stream-access FILE object via WriteProperty requests, an attacker can remotely truncate content that was intended to remain intact and read-only. This capability undermines the reliability of building automation systems by corrupting or destroying critical configuration data or historical logs stored within these files. The lack of validation for write operations on read-only objects represents a fundamental failure in enforcing access control policies at the application layer, allowing privilege escalation from simple network interaction to significant system state manipulation.

From an industry standards perspective, this vulnerability maps directly to CWE-20 Improper Input Validation and CWE-134 Use of Externally-Controlled Format String or CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code (if code execution were possible via heap corruption) but most accurately aligns with CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write in the context of memory management errors, although here it manifests as an information disclosure through uninitialized read. It also relates to CWE-269 Improvement of Privilege or Access Control by bypassing checks for object attributes. In terms of attack vectors, this falls under MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts if authentication is required, but more broadly represents a flaw in the implementation phase that allows remote data exfiltration and system disruption without requiring complex exploitation chains beyond standard protocol interactions.

Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate software updates to version 1.5.1 or later where this logic has been corrected. Developers should ensure that all property modification requests, particularly those affecting file size or content, undergo rigorous validation against the object's current access control attributes before proceeding with memory operations. Implementing strict checks for read-only status prior to any realloc() calls is essential to prevent both information leakage and unauthorized data mutation. Furthermore, adopting secure coding practices such as explicitly initializing newly allocated memory regions using functions like memset can provide defense-in-depth against uninitialized memory exposure vulnerabilities even if access control logic fails in other parts of the system.

Responsible

GitHub M

Reservation

07/15/2026

Disclosure

11/13/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00249

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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