CVE-2026-63731 in HyperDX
Summary
by MITRE • 07/20/2026
HyperDX before 2.31.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated team members to direct the server to arbitrary internal destinations by supplying a caller-controlled host parameter to the ClickHouse proxy test endpoint with no URL validation or allowlist enforcement. Attackers can exploit the reflected error responses from the endpoint to disclose internal service response bodies, enabling access to internal APIs, container services, and cloud provider metadata endpoints.
Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/20/2026
This vulnerability in HyperDX versions prior to 2.31.0 represents a critical server-side request forgery flaw that undermines the security boundaries of the application. The issue stems from inadequate input validation within the ClickHouse proxy test endpoint, where the system fails to properly sanitize or validate host parameters provided by authenticated users. The absence of URL validation or allowlist enforcement creates an exploitable condition where malicious actors can manipulate the host parameter to target internal network resources that should remain protected from external access.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability allows authenticated team members to leverage the proxy endpoint as a means of bypassing normal network segmentation controls. When attackers supply crafted host parameters, the system processes these requests without proper validation, effectively turning the legitimate proxy functionality into an attack vector. The reflected error responses generated by the vulnerable endpoint provide attackers with detailed information about internal service responses, creating a reconnaissance opportunity that can reveal the structure and configuration of internal systems.
From an operational impact perspective, this vulnerability enables attackers to access sensitive internal APIs, container services, and cloud provider metadata endpoints that typically should only be accessible through internal network paths. The disclosure of internal service response bodies provides attackers with valuable information about system architecture, potentially revealing authentication mechanisms, API endpoints, and service configurations that can be leveraged for further exploitation. This vulnerability essentially removes the network isolation that should protect internal systems from unauthorized access.
The security implications extend beyond simple data disclosure to encompass potential privilege escalation and lateral movement within the internal network. Attackers can use the information gathered through reflected error responses to identify vulnerable services, understand system dependencies, and plan more sophisticated attacks against internal infrastructure. This vulnerability aligns with CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery and maps to ATT&CK techniques such as T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS and T1566 Phishing.
Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including the deployment of proper input validation controls that enforce strict URL format checking on all user-supplied host parameters. The solution requires implementing allowlists or denylists for valid destination URLs, ensuring that only pre-approved internal endpoints can be accessed through the proxy functionality. Additionally, organizations should consider implementing network segmentation controls that limit the ability of authenticated users to access internal services directly through application interfaces, and should enhance monitoring to detect unusual patterns in proxy usage that may indicate exploitation attempts.