CVE-2026-64626 in AVideo
Summary
by MITRE • 07/21/2026
AVideo versions from commit 0dbadbca through latest master contain a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the encoder download-by-URL flow due to an unpinned retry fallback that bypasses DNS pinning validation. An authenticated attacker can supply a downloadURL that redirects to an internal address, causing the unpinned retry to follow the redirect and reach internal targets for blind SSRF attacks.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/21/2026
This vulnerability exists within video processing systems where the encoder component handles URL downloads through a server-side request forgery mechanism. The flaw manifests in the download-by-URL flow where the system implements an unpinned retry fallback mechanism that circumvents DNS pinning validation controls. This creates a critical security gap allowing authenticated attackers to manipulate the download process by providing malicious URLs that redirect to internal network addresses. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it enables blind server-side request forgery attacks where the system's internal components become unwitting proxies for attacker-controlled requests. The issue stems from improper handling of HTTP redirects within the retry logic, where the system fails to maintain strict validation of target addresses during subsequent attempts. According to CWE-918, this represents a Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability that allows attackers to manipulate the target of server-side requests through manipulation of URL parameters and redirect handling mechanisms. The ATT&CK framework categorizes this as a technique for Initial Access and Lateral Movement through server-side exploitation. Organizations using affected video processing systems face significant risk of internal network reconnaissance, data exfiltration, and potential system compromise through this vector. The vulnerability affects all versions from commit 0dbadbca up to the latest master branch, indicating a persistent flaw in the retry mechanism implementation that has not been addressed through recent code changes. This type of vulnerability is particularly concerning because it operates silently in the background, allowing attackers to probe internal systems without direct exposure of their activities.
The technical exploitation requires an authenticated user context which reduces the attack surface but does not eliminate the risk entirely. The system's retry logic fails to maintain consistent validation of target addresses across multiple attempts, creating a window where redirect chains can bypass initial security controls. This design flaw allows attackers to craft URLs that initially appear legitimate but contain redirect chains leading to internal network resources. The DNS pinning validation that should prevent such attacks is effectively circumvented when the system follows redirects during retry operations. Security controls designed to protect against internal network access are rendered ineffective due to this implementation gap in the retry mechanism's validation logic. The vulnerability demonstrates a classic case of insufficient input validation and improper handling of redirect chains in server-side applications.
Organizations should immediately implement mitigations including strict URL validation that prevents redirect following during retry operations, implementing comprehensive network segmentation to limit internal access, and adding additional layers of authentication for critical system components. The recommended approach involves modifying the retry logic to maintain strict address validation regardless of redirect chain complexity, ensuring that DNS pinning controls remain effective throughout all download attempts. Network monitoring should be enhanced to detect unusual outbound requests from the video processing systems, particularly those targeting internal addresses. Regular security audits should verify that retry mechanisms in similar components have proper validation controls in place. This vulnerability highlights the importance of maintaining consistent security controls across all request handling flows and demonstrates how seemingly minor implementation details can create significant security risks. The remediation strategy should focus on implementing robust URL validation that considers all potential redirect paths and maintains strict adherence to initial security constraints throughout the entire download process, preventing any bypass of network access controls through retry mechanisms.