CVE-2026-64824 in Home Assistant Core
Summary
by MITRE • 07/21/2026
Home Assistant Core before 2026.7.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the backup-restore function that allows attackers to write files to arbitrary absolute filesystem paths by supplying a crafted tar archive with a SYMTYPE entry containing a benign member name paired with an absolute linkname pointing outside the extraction directory. Because the official Docker image runs the Home Assistant process as root and the subsequent regular-file entry is written through the unvalidated symlink, attackers can achieve remote code execution by overwriting auto-imported Python paths such as site-packages/sitecustomize.py or custom component directories.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/21/2026
This vulnerability exists within the backup-restore functionality of Home Assistant Core versions prior to 2026.6.0 and represents a critical path traversal flaw that enables arbitrary file system manipulation through crafted tar archives. The technical implementation exploits the handling of symbolic link entries within tar files where the SYMTYPE entry allows attackers to specify a benign member name while simultaneously defining an absolute linkname that points outside the intended extraction directory. This design flaw falls under CWE-22 Path Traversal vulnerability classification and aligns with ATT&CK technique T1059.007 for execution through scripting languages, specifically Python in this context.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe as it allows attackers to write files to any arbitrary absolute filesystem path when the tar archive is processed during backup restoration. The vulnerability becomes particularly dangerous when combined with the fact that the official Docker image executes Home Assistant processes as root user, eliminating privilege restrictions that would normally prevent such attacks. When an attacker crafts a malicious tar file containing a symbolic link entry followed by a regular file entry, the system creates the symbolic link pointing to an external location and then writes the subsequent file entry through that unvalidated symlink, effectively bypassing directory traversal protections.
The remote code execution capability arises from the ability to overwrite critical Python import paths within the Home Assistant environment. Attackers can target auto-imported Python paths such as site-packages/sitecustomize.py or custom component directories where the Python interpreter automatically loads and executes code during startup. This exploitation method leverages the principle of least privilege violation by allowing an attacker to inject malicious code into locations that are automatically executed, enabling persistent access and further compromise of the system. The vulnerability essentially allows attackers to modify the Python runtime environment itself, providing them with a powerful foothold for continued system control.
Mitigation strategies should focus on upgrading to Home Assistant Core version 2026.6.0 or later where the path traversal vulnerability has been addressed through proper validation of symbolic link targets and implementation of strict directory boundary checks during tar archive extraction. Organizations should also implement network segmentation and access controls to limit exposure of backup-restore functions, particularly in containerized environments where the root privilege escalation risk is amplified. Additionally, regular security audits of backup files and implementation of file integrity monitoring can help detect unauthorized modifications to critical system paths. The vulnerability demonstrates the importance of validating all inputs from untrusted sources and implementing proper access controls even within seemingly trusted application components such as backup restoration utilities.