CVE-2026-64622 in Network-AI
Summary
by MITRE • 07/20/2026
Network-AI (npm: network-ai) versions 5.12.2 through 5.13.3 fail to apply the configured authorization check (checkAuth/secret) to the ApprovalInbox GET read routes, so even when an operator configures a secret, unauthenticated actors can access sensitive approval request details. The GET /approvals/?status=all, GET /approvals/:id, GET /approvals/stats, and GET /approvals/sse routes disclose full ApprovalEntry content including action/target shell-command strings, file paths, justifications, and risk levels. All responses also carry a hardcoded Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header, enabling cross-origin disclosure from any website the operator visits. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/20/2026
The vulnerability in Network-AI npm package affects versions 5.12.2 through 5.13.3 and represents a critical authorization bypass flaw that undermines the security controls designed to protect sensitive approval request data. This issue stems from the failure to properly enforce configured authorization checks, specifically the checkAuth/secret mechanism that operators should be able to configure for access control. The flaw allows unauthenticated actors to gain unauthorized access to detailed approval request information through multiple GET endpoints including /approvals/?status=all, /approvals/:id, /approvals/stats, and /approvals/sse routes. These endpoints expose complete ApprovalEntry content which includes action and target shell-command strings, file paths, justifications, and risk levels that constitute sensitive operational data. The vulnerability is particularly concerning as it represents an incomplete remediation of a previously identified issue GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj, indicating potential regression or inadequate fix implementation in the affected versions.
The technical implementation flaw manifests in the application's failure to validate authentication credentials before serving sensitive data through the approval inbox routes. This authorization bypass occurs despite the system being configured with a secret parameter meant to control access to these privileged endpoints. The hardcoded Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header present in all responses creates an additional attack vector by enabling cross-origin resource sharing from any website, effectively allowing malicious actors to exploit this vulnerability from different origins without requiring complex exploitation techniques. This configuration exposes the system to cross-site request forgery attacks and enables attackers to harvest sensitive approval data through web-based attacks that can be executed from compromised websites or during routine browsing activities.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple information disclosure, as the exposed data includes shell command strings and file paths that could enable attackers to understand system operations and potentially escalate privileges. The presence of justifications and risk levels in the disclosed data provides attackers with insights into organizational security practices and decision-making processes around approval workflows. The cross-origin exposure through the wildcard CORS header significantly amplifies the threat surface, as it allows adversaries to leverage this vulnerability from any web context where a victim might browse, making it particularly dangerous for environments where operators frequently visit untrusted websites or where the application is accessed through web-based interfaces. This vulnerability directly violates security principles outlined in CWE-285 which addresses improper authorization and CWE-346 which covers origin validation failures.
Organizations using affected Network-AI versions should immediately implement mitigations including disabling access to the vulnerable routes when possible, implementing additional authentication layers, or upgrading to patched versions that properly enforce authorization controls. The fix should ensure that all approval inbox endpoints require proper authentication verification before returning sensitive data and remove the hardcoded CORS header in favor of specific origin validation. Security teams should also monitor for potential exploitation attempts by observing unauthorized access patterns to approval-related endpoints and consider implementing network-level controls to restrict access to these vulnerable routes until proper authentication enforcement is verified. The vulnerability demonstrates the importance of comprehensive security testing, particularly around authentication and authorization controls, and highlights how seemingly simple configuration parameters can create significant security gaps when not properly implemented or validated across all application endpoints.