CVE-2026-65124 in Infrastructure Controller
Summary
by MITRE • 09/22/2026
NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause an XML injection. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to data tampering and denial of service.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/22/2026
The NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller for Linux, a critical component in managing hardware-level operations within complex computing environments, has been identified as susceptible to XML Injection vulnerabilities. This security flaw arises from the application's insufficient validation or sanitization of user-supplied input before processing it through an XML parser. In many enterprise and data center deployments, this controller handles configuration updates, status reports, and management commands via structured data formats such as SOAP or RESTful APIs that rely on XML payloads. When these inputs are not rigorously checked against a whitelist of expected characters or structures, malicious actors can inject arbitrary XML code into the processing stream. This type of vulnerability is fundamentally categorized under CWE-611, which describes Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference, and often overlaps with CWE-74, Injection flaws in general, depending on how the injected content interacts with downstream systems or parsers.
The technical mechanism behind this exploitation involves an attacker crafting a specially formatted HTTP request containing malicious XML entities. By leveraging features such as external entity declarations (DOCTYPE) or parameter entities within the XML payload, the attacker can force the vulnerable parser to process data from unintended sources. This capability allows for Server-Side Request Forgery scenarios where the controller is compelled to make requests to internal network resources that would otherwise be inaccessible due to firewall rules or access control lists. Furthermore, if the underlying system processes these entities in a way that exposes file contents or executes commands based on parsed values, the scope of impact expands significantly beyond simple data manipulation. The lack of strict input validation creates an attack surface where untrusted data is treated as executable code or structural directives by the XML processing engine.
The operational impact of successfully exploiting this vulnerability can be severe and multifaceted. Primarily, it enables data tampering, allowing attackers to alter configuration parameters that dictate how hardware components behave, potentially leading to system instability or misconfiguration. More critically, the ability to trigger denial of service conditions means an attacker could exhaust system resources by forcing the parser into infinite loops through crafted entity expansions, such as Billion Laughs attacks, thereby rendering the infrastructure controller unavailable for legitimate management tasks. In a production environment where high availability is paramount, this disruption can cascade into broader outages affecting dependent services and applications hosted on the affected hardware. Additionally, if external entities are resolved to local files or internal endpoints, sensitive information disclosure becomes possible, compromising confidentiality alongside integrity and availability.
From a threat intelligence perspective, this vulnerability aligns with MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to Command and Control via Application Layer Protocol as well as Initial Access vectors that exploit web services. Attackers may use XML injection as an initial foothold within the management plane of NVIDIA hardware, leveraging it for lateral movement or persistent access if combined with other weaknesses like weak authentication mechanisms. The presence of such flaws in infrastructure controllers highlights the risk associated with managing critical physical assets through software interfaces that may not have undergone rigorous security testing comparable to standard application servers.
To mitigate these risks, immediate remediation should focus on applying vendor-provided patches that address the input validation logic within the XML parsing routines. Organizations must ensure their NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller versions are updated to the latest secure release as soon as available. In addition to patching, defensive measures include implementing strict allow-lists for all inputs accepted by the controller’s API endpoints and disabling any unnecessary XML features such as external entity resolution if they are not required for legitimate functionality. Network-level controls should also be reviewed to ensure that management interfaces are isolated from untrusted networks and protected by robust authentication mechanisms like mutual TLS or strong credential policies. Regular security assessments, including static code analysis focused on injection flaws and dynamic testing of API endpoints, will help identify similar vulnerabilities before they can be exploited in the wild.