CVE-2026-83805 in Nautobot
Summary
by MITRE • 09/22/2026
Nautobot is a Network Source of Truth and Network Automation Platform. From 3.0.0 until 3.1.8, the generic ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse create endpoint does not enforce approver-group membership, change permission on the object under review, or the one-response-per-user restriction applied by the intended approve and deny actions. A user with only extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse can submit approved responses directly, while writable user and state fields permit responses to be attributed to arbitrary users. These forged responses can satisfy min_approvers, approve the workflow, and activate its gated ScheduledJob without a legitimate approver. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.8.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/22/2026
Nautobot serves as a critical Network Source of Truth and automation platform for many enterprise infrastructure teams, managing complex workflows that govern changes to network devices and configurations. Within the architecture of Nautobot versions ranging from 3.0.0 through 3.1.8, a significant security flaw exists within the generic ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse create endpoint. This vulnerability stems from an insufficient access control mechanism where the system fails to enforce critical business logic rules that are typically applied during standard approval and denial actions. Specifically, the endpoint does not verify whether the submitting user belongs to the required approver group, nor does it validate if the user possesses the necessary change permissions on the specific object currently under review. Furthermore, the restriction limiting users to a single response per workflow stage is also bypassed in this context.
The technical core of this vulnerability lies in the ability for an authenticated user with only the extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse permission to directly submit responses that are marked as approved. This capability allows attackers or malicious insiders to forge approval states without undergoing legitimate review processes. Additionally, because writable fields exist for both the response state and the associated user identity, it is possible to attribute these forged approvals to arbitrary users rather than the actual actor performing the action. This manipulation enables the creation of fake audit trails that appear valid within the system while completely subverting the intended security controls designed to prevent unauthorized changes.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, particularly in environments where Nautobot gates critical infrastructure modifications through scheduled jobs and automated workflows. By submitting forged approved responses, an attacker can satisfy the minimum number of required approvers defined by the workflow configuration. Once these artificial approvals are recorded, the system considers the workflow stage complete, thereby triggering the activation of gated ScheduledJobs. This effectively allows unauthorized changes to be deployed to production network devices or configurations without any legitimate oversight, potentially leading to service outages, security breaches, or compliance violations depending on the nature of the automated actions triggered by the compromised workflow.
This issue represents a classic case of broken access control where API endpoints do not consistently enforce the same business logic rules as their corresponding user interface counterparts. In terms of industry standards, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-284 Improper Access Control and CWE-915 Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes due to the manipulation of state fields. From a threat modeling perspective using MITRE ATT&CK techniques, it relates to Tactic TA0003 Persistence or TA0005 Defense Evasion through abuse of existing functionality, and potentially TA0002 Execution if the triggered scheduled jobs involve running scripts on network devices. The flaw highlights the importance of ensuring that backend API endpoints enforce all security constraints present in higher-level application logic to prevent privilege escalation via workflow manipulation.
To mitigate this risk, organizations must immediately upgrade Nautobot to version 3.1.8 or later, where these access control checks have been properly implemented and enforced on the generic approval endpoint. Until upgrading is feasible, administrators should restrict direct API access for users who do not require it, ensuring that only trusted service accounts with elevated privileges can interact directly with workflow endpoints. Additionally, implementing strict monitoring of ScheduledJob activations linked to ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse events can help detect anomalous patterns indicative of this exploitation attempt. Regular audits of approval logs against actual user permissions and group memberships are also recommended to identify any historical instances where the vulnerability may have been exploited prior to remediation.