CVE-2026-66069 in RabbitMQ
Summary
by MITRE • 09/24/2026
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.1.13, 4.2.7, and 4.3.0, is_authorized/2 uses is_authorized_monitor for all methods. DELETE resets rabbit_core_metrics:reset_auth_attempt_metrics(). Impact is cosmetic (counters only, no log erasure), but inconsistent with rabbit_mgmt_wm_reset.erl which requires admin for the analogous operation. A monitoring-tagged user can reset the per-node authentication-attempt counters via DELETE /api/auth/attempts/:node, erasing evidence of brute-force activity. The sibling endpoint wm_reset requires administrator. Preconditions include Management plugin enabled monitoring tag. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.13, 4.2.7, and 4.3.0.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/24/2026
RabbitMQ serves as a robust messaging and streaming broker widely deployed in enterprise environments to facilitate asynchronous communication between distributed systems. The management plugin provides an HTTP API that allows administrators and users to monitor and control the broker's state. A specific vulnerability exists within the authentication attempt metrics reset functionality prior to versions 4.1.13, 4.2.7, and 4.3.0. This flaw stems from a logic error in the authorization handling for the endpoint responsible for resetting per-node authentication-attempt counters via HTTP DELETE requests to /api/auth/attempts/:node. The underlying code incorrectly utilizes is_authorized_monitor for all methods associated with this operation rather than enforcing stricter administrative privileges required for state-altering actions.
The technical flaw lies in the inconsistent application of access control policies within the management plugin's web machine handlers. Specifically, the function rabbit_mgmt_wm_reset.erl correctly requires administrator-level permissions to perform analogous reset operations on other metrics or system states. However, the handler for resetting authentication attempt counters fails to distinguish between monitoring-only roles and administrative roles when processing DELETE requests. Consequently, any user assigned a management tag with only monitoring privileges can successfully execute this operation. This represents an authorization bypass where lower-privileged users are granted capabilities that should be restricted to high-privilege administrators due to the sensitive nature of modifying security-related metrics.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is primarily related to anti-forensics and evidence tampering rather than direct system compromise or data exfiltration. By resetting the authentication attempt counters, an attacker with monitoring privileges can erase logs that track failed login attempts on a specific node. This capability effectively masks brute-force attacks against RabbitMQ user accounts. While the vulnerability is described as cosmetic because it does not delete actual log files from disk and only resets in-memory counters used for metrics display, its security implications are significant. The erasure of these counters removes critical indicators of compromise that security operations teams rely upon to detect credential stuffing or brute-force campaigns targeting the message broker infrastructure.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-269, which describes Improper Privilege Management, as it allows a user with lower privileges to perform actions reserved for higher-level administrators. Furthermore, from an offensive perspective, this capability supports ATT&CK technique T1070, specifically sub-technique T1070.004 related to Indicator Removal on Host or System, where adversaries clear logs or metrics to evade detection and maintain persistence without triggering alerts based on anomalous authentication patterns. The precondition for exploiting this flaw is that the RabbitMQ Management plugin must be enabled and the attacker must possess a user account with at least monitoring-level permissions within the management interface.
Mitigation strategies involve upgrading RabbitMQ to version 4.1.13, 4.2.7, or 4.3.0 where this authorization logic has been corrected to enforce administrative requirements for resetting authentication metrics. In environments where immediate patching is not feasible, administrators should restrict the assignment of management tags to only those users who genuinely require full control over the broker's configuration and security settings. Additionally, organizations should implement external logging solutions that persist authentication attempt data independently of RabbitMQ's internal counters, ensuring that evidence of brute-force activity remains available even if the in-memory metrics are reset by a compromised monitoring account.