CVE-2026-67224 in RabbitMQ
Summary
by MITRE • 09/24/2026
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1, The trace consumer constructs the output path as filename:join(TraceDir, Name ++ ".log") where Name comes from PUT /api/traces/:vhost/:name. No safe_relative_path / traversal check is applied on the write side, while the read side (rabbit_tracing_files.erl) does call rabbit_misc:safe_relative_path/1 , proving the omission is an oversight, not design. The .log suffix is forced and the endpoint requires administrator. A user with the administrator tag can write a .log-suffixed file to an arbitrary filesystem path writable by the rabbitmq user via the tracing plugin's name parameter, e.g. /etc/cron.d/x.log (if writable) or overwrite existing .log files outside the trace directory. Preconditions include rabbitmq_tracing plugin enabled administrator tag Target path writable by rabbitmq OS user. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/24/2026
The vulnerability identified involves a path traversal flaw within the RabbitMQ messaging broker's tracing plugin, specifically affecting versions prior to 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1. This issue stems from an inconsistency in how file paths are validated during write operations compared to read operations within the rabbit_tracing_files module. When a user interacts with the PUT /api/traces/:vhost/:name endpoint to configure trace consumers, the system constructs the output log path by concatenating the configured TraceDir with the provided Name parameter and appending a .log suffix. Crucially, this write-side construction lacks any validation using safe_relative_path checks, which are present in the read-side logic of rabbit_tracing_files.erl. This discrepancy indicates that the omission is an oversight rather than a deliberate design choice, as the system already possesses the necessary mechanisms to prevent directory traversal but fails to apply them consistently across all file operations.
An attacker possessing administrator privileges for RabbitMQ can exploit this flaw by supplying a malicious Name parameter containing relative path sequences such as ../ or absolute paths if permitted by the operating system's permissions model. Since the .log suffix is forcibly appended, an adversary could craft a request that writes to arbitrary filesystem locations writable by the rabbitmq user account on the host OS. For instance, it is possible to write files into sensitive directories like /etc/cron.d/ or overwrite existing log files outside the designated trace directory. The practical impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data corruption; if an attacker can write executable scripts or configuration files in locations where they are subsequently executed by system services with higher privileges, such as cron daemons running under root, it could lead to remote code execution and full compromise of the underlying host infrastructure.
This flaw is categorized under CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, which describes vulnerabilities allowing access to files or directories that are outside the intended restricted directory. In terms of attack tactics, this aligns with ATT&CK techniques related to Command and Scripting Interpreter via file manipulation, specifically where an attacker leverages system services like cron for persistence or privilege escalation. The precondition for exploitation requires that the rabbitmq_tracing plugin is enabled on the broker instance and that the target administrator user has sufficient permissions to invoke the tracing API endpoints. Furthermore, the success of the attack depends heavily on the operating system's file permission settings, specifically whether the rabbitmq process user has write access to the targeted arbitrary path.
Mitigation for this vulnerability involves upgrading RabbitMQ to one of the fixed versions listed above, which implement consistent safe_relative_path validation across both read and write operations in the tracing module. Until an upgrade is feasible, administrators should restrict network access to the RabbitMQ management API endpoints to trusted sources only and ensure that the rabbitmq user account operates with minimal filesystem permissions, adhering to the principle of least privilege. Additionally, monitoring for unusual file creation events in system directories can help detect potential exploitation attempts before they result in significant compromise.