CVE-2026-6727 in TPM
Summary
by MITRE • 08/11/2026
A timing side-channel vulnerability exists in the RSA OAEP decryption implementation. A privileged local attacker with access to the TPM command interface may be able to exploit timing differences to recover information that could allow decryption of ciphertexts encrypted to TPM-managed RSA keys, including the RSA Endorsement Key (EK), including import blobs, credential blobs, and session salts. Under certain conditions, this may also enable the forgery of TPM 2.0 attestations. Refer to TCGVRT0011.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/11/2026
This vulnerability represents a sophisticated timing side-channel attack targeting the RSA OAEP decryption implementation within Trusted Platform Module (TPM) systems. The flaw exists in how the TPM processes cryptographic operations, specifically during RSA decryption routines where timing variations can inadvertently leak information about the internal computation process. A privileged local attacker with access to the TPM command interface can exploit these temporal differences to infer sensitive cryptographic data through careful analysis of response times during decryption operations.
The technical nature of this vulnerability aligns with CWE-385, which categorizes timing side-channel attacks as a class of weaknesses where an attacker can gain information by measuring the time taken for cryptographic operations. The vulnerability specifically impacts the RSA OAEP decryption implementation within TPM 2.0, where the timing characteristics of the decryption process reveal information about the private key or intermediate computations. This allows attackers to perform statistical analysis on timing measurements to recover the RSA Endorsement Key (EK) and other sensitive data including import blobs, credential blobs, and session salts that are encrypted using TPM-managed RSA keys.
The operational impact extends beyond simple data recovery to include potential attestation forgery capabilities under certain conditions. When an attacker can successfully extract information about the EK or other cryptographic materials, they gain the ability to forge TPM 2.0 attestations, which undermines the fundamental security guarantees that TPMs provide for system integrity and authentication. This vulnerability affects the core trust model of TPM implementations, as it allows attackers to compromise the authenticity of platform measurements and certificates that rely on TPM-protected keys.
The attack vector requires local privileged access to the TPM command interface, making it a significant concern for systems where such access might be available through legitimate administrative channels or through exploitation of other vulnerabilities. Mitigation strategies should include implementing constant-time cryptographic algorithms that do not vary execution time based on input data, which directly addresses the underlying CWE-385 weakness. Additionally, TPM implementations should incorporate countermeasures against timing side-channel attacks as recommended in the Trusted Computing Group's security guidelines and standards. Organizations should also consider applying firmware updates from TPM vendors that address this specific timing vulnerability while maintaining proper access controls to limit privileged command interface access to authorized personnel only.
The vulnerability demonstrates how seemingly benign timing variations in cryptographic implementations can create significant security risks, particularly in systems where the TPM serves as a core security component for platform authentication and key management. This type of attack represents a sophisticated approach that leverages the mathematical properties of RSA decryption combined with precise measurement capabilities to extract sensitive information. The implications extend to any system relying on TPM 2.0 for secure boot processes, identity verification, or encryption key protection where timing side-channel vulnerabilities could be exploited to compromise the entire security infrastructure.