CVE-2026-70597 in Electron
Summary
by MITRE • 08/05/2026
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, the check Electron uses on macOS to confirm it was launched by a same-signed parent process could be bypassed by a local process. Apps that enable fuse-based hardening restricting ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE and NODE_OPTIONS to same-signed parents rely on this check, and a local attacker could bypass it and run code inside the signed app, inheriting its TCC permissions and keychain access. This issue is fixed in 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/05/2026
This vulnerability represents a critical security flaw in the Electron framework that affects macOS applications built with versions prior to specific patches. The issue stems from an insufficient validation mechanism that was designed to ensure applications could only be launched by same-signed parent processes, a security feature intended to prevent unauthorized code execution within trusted application contexts. The flaw specifically impacts applications that utilize fuse-based hardening mechanisms which restrict the ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE and NODE_OPTIONS environment variables to maintain security boundaries between different execution contexts.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability allows local attackers to bypass the signature verification check through a carefully crafted local process attack vector. This bypass occurs because Electron's macOS launch validation does not properly verify the signing status of parent processes in all scenarios, creating an exploitable condition where malicious code can be executed within the context of a legitimate signed application. The security implications are severe as applications that rely on this protection mechanism for enforcing hardening measures become vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it allows attackers to inherit the target application's TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) permissions, which include access to sensitive system resources like the keychain, camera, microphone, and other user data. When an attacker successfully exploits this bypass, they gain elevated privileges within the application context, enabling them to perform actions that would normally be restricted to legitimate users or processes. This creates a significant risk for applications handling sensitive information or requiring high-privilege system access.
Applications implementing fuse-based hardening measures that restrict ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE and NODE_OPTIONS environment variables are particularly vulnerable because they depend on the parent process signature validation to maintain their security posture. The fix addresses this by strengthening the validation logic to properly verify signing status across all execution paths, ensuring that only processes with matching signatures can establish the required trust relationship. This patch resolves the inconsistency in macOS launch verification that allowed local attackers to circumvent the intended security boundaries.
From a cybersecurity perspective, this vulnerability aligns with common attack patterns documented in the ATT&CK framework under privilege escalation techniques, specifically targeting application sandboxing mechanisms and code execution within trusted contexts. The issue also relates to CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) and CWE-276 (Incorrect Default Permissions), as it represents a failure to properly enforce access control boundaries between different process execution contexts. Organizations should immediately update their Electron-based applications to versions 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, or 42.0.0-beta.3 to mitigate this risk and ensure proper enforcement of application security boundaries on macOS platforms.