CVE-2026-82857 in Hulumi
Summary
by MITRE • 08/31/2026
hulumi versions before v1.3.2 contain a privilege escalation vulnerability in the weekly integration IAM policy that allows role lifecycle operations on af-e2e-* roles without sufficient boundary restrictions. Attackers with the documented principal can create persistent higher-privilege roles in the sandbox account.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/31/2026
The identified security flaw resides within the Hulumi software, specifically affecting versions prior to v1.3.2. This vulnerability is classified as a privilege escalation issue stemming from an overly permissive Identity and Access Management policy configuration associated with weekly integrations. The core technical deficiency lies in the lack of sufficient boundary restrictions when defining permissions for role lifecycle operations targeting resources prefixed with af-e2e-. In cloud environments, particularly those utilizing AWS IAM or similar identity frameworks, policies must adhere to the principle of least privilege by explicitly limiting actions and resource scopes. Here, the policy grants broad authority over role creation and modification without adequate constraints on which specific roles can be affected or what permissions these newly created roles may assume. This architectural oversight allows any principal authorized under this integration context to manipulate IAM roles in a manner that bypasses intended security boundaries.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability enables attackers who possess the documented principal credentials to escalate their privileges significantly within the sandbox account environment. By exploiting the unrestricted role lifecycle operations, an adversary can create new IAM roles with elevated permissions that persist beyond immediate exploitation windows. These persistent higher-privilege roles serve as a foothold for further lateral movement and data exfiltration. The ability to establish such roles effectively grants the attacker administrative control over specific segments of the cloud infrastructure, potentially leading to full compromise of the sandbox environment if left unaddressed. This scenario aligns with common attack patterns where initial access is leveraged to create backdoor accounts or overly privileged service identities that are difficult to detect and remove without proper auditing mechanisms in place.
This vulnerability maps directly to CWE-269, which describes Improper Privilege Assignment, as the system fails to enforce appropriate restrictions on user privileges during role creation. Furthermore, it relates to ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts, specifically when used for persistence through the creation of new privileged identities. The lack of boundary conditions also touches upon CWE-250, where the software does not perform sufficient checks or validations before allowing actions that could impact system integrity. In cloud-native architectures, such misconfigurations are critical because they undermine the isolation guarantees provided by identity management systems, turning a sandbox environment into an attack vector for broader infrastructure compromise.
To mitigate this risk, immediate remediation involves upgrading Hulumi to version v1.3.2 or later, where these permission boundaries have been corrected. In addition to software updates, organizations should review and tighten IAM policies associated with integration services to ensure that role lifecycle operations are restricted to specific, necessary resources rather than broad prefixes like af-e2e-*. Implementing AWS Organizations SCPs or similar guardrails can provide an additional layer of protection by enforcing organizational-level restrictions on permission boundaries. Regular auditing of IAM roles for unexpected permissions and enabling comprehensive logging via CloudTrail or equivalent services will help detect any unauthorized role creations promptly. Ensuring that all integration principals operate under strict least-privilege constraints is essential to preventing future privilege escalation incidents in cloud environments.