CVE-2026-82870 in ToolJet
Summary
by MITRE • 08/31/2026
ToolJet before v3.16.208 fails to validate organizationId ownership in database write and destroy routes, allowing any builder-role user to create, alter, or drop tables in other organizations' databases. Attackers can exploit missing organization-resolving guards to permanently delete tables, insert arbitrary data, and modify schemas across tenant boundaries on shared instances.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/31/2026
The vulnerability identified in ToolJet versions prior to 3.16.208 represents a critical failure in multi-tenant isolation mechanisms within the application's backend logic. Specifically, the database write and destroy routes lack proper validation of organization ownership for the resources being accessed or modified. This architectural flaw allows any user authenticated with builder-role privileges to bypass tenant boundaries by manipulating request parameters that specify target databases or tables belonging to other organizations on shared instances. The core technical issue lies in the absence of server-side checks that verify whether the requesting user's associated organization ID matches the ownership identifier of the database schema being targeted for modification.
From a technical perspective, this is a classic case of Insecure Direct Object Reference combined with Broken Access Control. When an API endpoint receives requests to create, alter, or drop tables, it typically relies on identifiers passed in the request body or URL path without cross-referencing them against the authenticated user's permissions and organizational context. By exploiting this missing guard, an attacker can inject organization IDs from other tenants into these parameters. Since the application does not validate that the current session belongs to the specified organization before executing database commands, it proceeds with the operation as if the request were legitimate for that tenant. This effectively neutralizes the logical separation between different customers sharing the same infrastructure.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and potentially catastrophic for organizations using shared ToolJet instances. An attacker can permanently delete critical tables within other tenants' databases, leading to irreversible data loss and service disruption. Furthermore, the ability to insert arbitrary data allows for potential data poisoning or injection attacks that could compromise downstream applications relying on that data. The capability to modify schemas across tenant boundaries means an attacker can alter table structures, add columns with malicious default values, or change constraints in ways that affect other users' workflows. This breaks the fundamental trust model of multi-tenant SaaS platforms where data isolation is paramount for security and compliance.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-639, which describes Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, as well as CWE-284, indicating Improper Access Control. In terms of offensive cyber operations mapping, this exploit technique corresponds to ATT&CK T1078, Valid Accounts, specifically the sub-category of exploiting existing valid credentials with insufficient privilege restrictions. It also relates to T1565, Data Manipulation, as it involves unauthorized modification or destruction of stored data. The lack of proper ownership validation is a common pitfall in rapid application development platforms where ease of use sometimes overshadows rigorous security checks for multi-tenancy scenarios.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations must immediately upgrade to ToolJet version 3.16.208 or later, which includes the necessary fixes for these authorization gaps. For environments that cannot be updated instantly due to operational constraints, implementing a reverse proxy rule can provide temporary relief by inspecting API requests and ensuring that organization identifiers in payloads match those associated with the authenticated session token. Additionally, database-level permissions should be reviewed to ensure that application service accounts do not possess overly broad privileges such as unrestricted DROP TABLE or ALTER SCHEMA rights across all databases on the instance. Regular security audits focusing on multi-tenant isolation logic are essential to prevent similar flaws from being introduced in future updates.