CVE-2026-8374 in Lock
Summary
by MITRE • 10/09/2026
Misuse and misconfiguration in Bluetooth communication in SwitchBot Door Lock Series allows an attacker to bypass the electronic lock and access controls via a manipulated communication protocol.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/09/2026
The vulnerability identified within the SwitchBot Door Lock Series represents a critical failure in the implementation of secure Bluetooth Low Energy communications, specifically categorized under CWE-284 Improper Access Control and CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials if static keys are involved. This flaw stems from insufficient validation mechanisms during the pairing and authentication phases of the BLE protocol stack. In a properly secured IoT device, every command sent to unlock or lock the mechanism must be cryptographically signed with a session key derived through a secure handshake process that verifies both the identity of the requester and the integrity of the message payload. However, in this specific implementation, the firmware fails to strictly enforce these cryptographic checks for certain control commands, allowing an attacker who is within physical proximity to intercept, manipulate, or replay communication packets without possessing valid authentication credentials.
From a technical perspective, the exploitation vector relies on the manipulation of the Bluetooth GATT (Generic Attribute Profile) characteristics that govern lock state changes. An adversary equipped with standard BLE sniffing tools can observe the traffic between the mobile application and the door lock to identify patterns in how unlock commands are structured. By exploiting the lack of strict sequence number validation or timestamp verification, an attacker can craft a malicious packet that mimics a legitimate unlock request. This is often facilitated by CWE-20 Improper Input Validation, where the device accepts malformed or out-of-sequence packets as valid instructions. The operational impact is severe, resulting in complete bypass of the electronic locking mechanism and unauthorized physical access to secured areas. Unlike brute-force attacks which leave audit trails, this method allows for silent, undetected entry that leaves no forensic evidence on the lock itself other than a standard unlock event log, making it difficult to distinguish from legitimate user activity without advanced network monitoring.
This vulnerability aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1563 Remote Service Abuse, where an attacker exploits trusted remote services or protocols to gain access. It also reflects CWE-924 Improper Enforcement of Message Integrity during Transmission in a Confidentiality and/or Authenticity Context. The root cause is often traced back to development practices that prioritize convenience over security, such as using static pairing keys instead of dynamic session keys derived from ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchanges, or failing to implement replay protection mechanisms like nonces or timestamps with strict validity windows. In many IoT deployments, the assumption that physical proximity provides sufficient security is flawed; modern BLE attacks can be executed at distances exceeding typical line-of-sight ranges using directional antennas or by exploiting protocol-level weaknesses that do not require direct signal strength thresholds for successful exploitation of logic flaws.
Mitigation strategies must address both firmware architecture and user configuration practices. The primary remediation involves implementing robust mutual authentication where the lock verifies the identity of the controlling device, and vice versa, using strong cryptographic algorithms such as AES-CCM with dynamic key derivation. Developers should enforce strict message integrity checks by including sequence numbers or timestamps in every command packet to prevent replay attacks, ensuring that any packet received outside a narrow time window is discarded immediately. Additionally, implementing rate limiting on authentication attempts can mitigate brute-force variants of this attack. For end-users, it is crucial to ensure the firmware is updated to the latest version provided by SwitchBot, as patches often address these protocol-level flaws. Users should also disable unnecessary BLE features if not required and avoid using default pairing codes that may have been hardcoded into earlier revisions of the device software. Regular security audits focusing on CWE-327 Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm can help identify similar weaknesses in other connected devices within an organization's infrastructure, ensuring a holistic approach to IoT security posture.