CVE-2026-85615 in Openpanel
Summary
by MITRE • 09/04/2026
Openpanel before 2.3.0 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in the report.getLayouts and report.resetLayout tRPC procedures that fail to bind dashboardId to the authorized projectId. Authenticated attackers can supply an arbitrary victim dashboardId with their own projectId to read report layouts and configurations or delete dashboard grid arrangements across tenants.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/04/2026
The identified security flaw represents a classic Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerability within the Openpanel analytics platform prior to version 2.3.0. This issue specifically affects two tRPC procedures, namely report.getLayouts and report.resetLayout. The core technical deficiency lies in the server-side validation logic which fails to enforce proper authorization checks between the dashboard identifier provided by the client and the project identifier associated with the authenticated user's session. In a secure implementation, any request accessing resources belonging to a specific tenant or organization must verify that the requesting entity has explicit permission for both the parent resource (the project) and the child resource (the dashboard). Here, the application accepts an arbitrary dashboardId from the attacker while binding it only to their own authorized projectId, effectively bypassing multi-tenant isolation boundaries.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability allows authenticated attackers to manipulate object references without proper ownership verification. When a user interacts with the reporting interface, they supply identifiers for dashboards they intend to view or modify. The backend processes these requests by looking up the dashboard using the provided ID and associating it with the current session's project context. Because there is no cross-reference check ensuring that the specified dashboardId actually belongs to the projectId linked to the authenticated user, an attacker can substitute a victim’s dashboard identifier into their request payload. This architectural oversight enables lateral movement across tenant boundaries, as the system trusts the client-supplied object reference rather than validating it against server-side access control lists or database ownership records.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant due to its potential for data exfiltration and service disruption within a multi-tenant SaaS environment. Attackers can exploit report.getLayouts to read sensitive configuration details, including dashboard layouts, widget configurations, and potentially underlying query structures that may reveal proprietary business logic or internal metrics. Furthermore, the exploitation of report.resetLayout allows attackers to delete or corrupt dashboard grid arrangements belonging to other tenants. This constitutes a denial of service for legitimate users who rely on these dashboards for monitoring and decision-making, while also causing potential data integrity issues if layout configurations are considered part of the persistent state management system.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-639, which describes Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, as well as CWE-284, Improper Access Control, where insufficient restrictions prevent unauthorized access to critical functionality or data. In terms of offensive security frameworks, this behavior maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1530, Data from Information Repositories, and potentially T1499, Endpoint Denial of Service, depending on the severity of the layout deletion impact. The lack of proper object reference validation is a common pitfall in modern API-driven applications that utilize RPC frameworks like tRPC without implementing rigorous middleware for authorization checks.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations running Openpanel versions earlier than 2.3.0 must upgrade to the patched version immediately where these access control mechanisms have been corrected. For environments unable to patch instantly, network-level controls such as Web Application Firewalls can be configured to inspect tRPC payloads for anomalies in project-dashboard ID relationships, although this is not a definitive fix. Developers should also conduct code reviews focusing on all API endpoints that accept object identifiers to ensure they implement strict ownership verification logic. This involves querying the database to confirm that the requested resource exists and belongs to the authenticated user’s authorized scope before processing any read or write operations. Implementing robust authorization middleware at the framework level can prevent similar issues across other parts of the application by enforcing consistent access control policies for all direct object references.