CVE-2026-92717 in Covenant
Summary
by MITRE • 09/16/2026
Covenant through 0.6 registers the CovenantHub SignalR hub without an Authorize attribute, allowing unauthenticated callers to invoke CreateHttpListener and receive a signed JWT token. Attackers can use the obtained token to authenticate against the entire operator API and access grunts, credentials, binaries, events, and the operator roster.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/16/2026
The vulnerability identified in Covenant versions through 0.6 stems from an improper implementation of authentication controls within its internal communication infrastructure. Specifically, the CovenantHub SignalR hub is registered without enforcing an Authorize attribute on all endpoints. This architectural oversight creates a critical security gap where unauthenticated external actors can interact with specific methods exposed by the hub. The most significant consequence of this misconfiguration is that attackers are able to invoke the CreateHttpListener method without providing valid credentials, which subsequently results in the generation and return of a signed JSON Web Token (JWT). This token serves as a legitimate authentication credential within the application's context, effectively bypassing the intended access control mechanisms.
Once an attacker obtains this JWT through the unauthenticated endpoint, they can utilize it to authenticate against the entire operator API interface. The possession of a valid token grants the adversary full operational privileges equivalent to those of a registered user or administrator within the Covenant framework. This level of access allows for comprehensive enumeration and manipulation of sensitive data stored by the tool. Attackers can retrieve grunts, which are the agent processes deployed on compromised targets, along with their associated credentials such as usernames and passwords harvested from victim systems. Furthermore, the attacker gains unrestricted access to binaries uploaded or generated during operations, detailed event logs that may reveal operational history and network topology, and a complete roster of operators including their permissions and activities.
From an industry standard perspective, this vulnerability is classified under CWE-287, which denotes Improper Authentication. The failure to enforce authentication on the SignalR hub endpoint represents a fundamental breakdown in identity verification protocols. Additionally, the exploitation path aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, specifically Valid Accounts, as the attacker leverages legitimate credentials (the JWT) obtained through an unintended vector to maintain persistent access and perform reconnaissance. The ability to enumerate grunts and credentials also touches upon CWE-200, Information Exposure, where sensitive system information is disclosed to unauthorized parties due to insufficient access controls.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe given the nature of Covenant as a command-and-control framework used for red teaming and penetration testing activities. If an instance of Covenant is exposed to untrusted networks or lacks proper network segmentation, any individual with network connectivity can compromise the entire operation. The exposure of grunts allows adversaries to take control of compromised hosts, while the leakage of credentials enables lateral movement across internal networks. Access to binaries may reveal proprietary tools or sensitive data collected during engagements, and visibility into operator activities could expose strategic plans or methodologies used by security teams. This effectively turns a defensive tool into an offensive asset for malicious actors if not properly secured.
To mitigate this risk, immediate remediation is required in the form of updating Covenant to version 0.7 or later where these authentication controls have been corrected. For environments running older versions that cannot be immediately updated, network-level mitigations should be implemented. This includes restricting access to the SignalR hub endpoints via firewall rules or reverse proxy configurations so that only trusted IP addresses can reach them. Additionally, ensuring that Covenant instances are not exposed directly to the internet and are instead placed within isolated virtual private networks significantly reduces the attack surface. Regular security audits of API endpoint configurations should be conducted to ensure that all sensitive methods require proper authentication attributes before execution.