CVE-2026-92795 in Studio
Summary
by MITRE • 09/16/2026
Coze Studio through 0.5.1 fails to restrict the server URL supplied when registering plugin tools, allowing authenticated users to make the backend fetch internal services. Attackers can construct plugin requests to access cloud metadata endpoints and internal services reachable only from the backend network, reading responses containing sensitive information.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/16/2026
The vulnerability identified in Coze Studio versions through 0.5.1 represents a critical server-side request forgery flaw rooted in insufficient input validation during the registration of plugin tools. When an authenticated user registers a new tool within the application interface, they are required to specify a backend URL that the system will use to fetch data or execute functions on behalf of the user. The core technical failure lies in the absence of strict allow-listing or domain restriction mechanisms for this server URL parameter. Instead of validating whether the provided hostname resolves to an external, public-facing service, the application blindly accepts any valid Uniform Resource Locator and instructs its internal backend processes to initiate HTTP requests to that address. This architectural oversight effectively transforms a standard plugin registration feature into a powerful vector for Server-Side Request Forgery attacks, as the application acts as a proxy without verifying the legitimacy or safety of the destination endpoint.
From an operational perspective, this flaw allows authenticated attackers to leverage the backend server's network privileges and identity. Since the requests originate from the Coze Studio backend infrastructure rather than directly from the attacker's client machine, they bypass standard perimeter security controls such as firewalls that restrict access based on source IP addresses or geographic location. Attackers can construct malicious plugin configurations pointing toward internal services that are not exposed to the public internet but remain accessible within the cloud provider’s private network topology. A primary target for exploitation is the instance metadata service endpoint, commonly found at addresses like 169.254.169.254 in AWS environments or similar endpoints in other major cloud providers such as Azure and Google Cloud Platform. By directing the backend to fetch data from these internal APIs, attackers can retrieve sensitive credentials, including temporary security tokens, access keys, and IAM role information, which are typically stored there for application authentication purposes.
The impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple credential theft. Once an attacker obtains cloud metadata, they can escalate their privileges within the compromised environment by assuming roles with higher permissions or accessing other internal microservices that rely on shared secrets or token-based authentication. This leads to a complete compromise of the underlying infrastructure and potentially affects multi-tenant environments if isolation mechanisms are weak. The ability to read responses containing sensitive information from internal services means that attackers can exfiltrate database connection strings, configuration files, and proprietary application logic details. This scenario aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK framework technique T1598, specifically Phishing for Information within a Multi-tenant Environment if cloud metadata is used to pivot between tenants, or more broadly under T1071 Application Layer Protocol when leveraging HTTP requests to exfiltrate data. It also maps directly to CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), highlighting the failure to validate user-supplied URLs against a set of permitted domains before processing them on the server side.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing strict input validation and network-level controls at both the application and infrastructure layers. At the application level, developers should enforce an allow-list approach where only pre-approved domain names or IP ranges are accepted for plugin tool registration. Any URL attempting to resolve to private IP address spaces, such as RFC 1918 addresses (10.x.x.x, 172.16-31.x.x, 192.168.x.x) or link-local addresses like 169.254.x.x, should be immediately rejected with an appropriate error message rather than being processed by the backend fetch mechanism. Additionally, implementing a timeout and size limit on outbound requests can prevent denial-of-service conditions resulting from slow internal services. From an infrastructure perspective, network segmentation is crucial; cloud metadata endpoints should be isolated in subnets that are not routable to general application servers unless absolutely necessary for specific integration needs. If such access is required, it must be tightly controlled using security groups or firewall rules that restrict traffic to only the specific ports and protocols needed for legitimate operations. Regular auditing of outbound network connections from backend services can also help detect anomalous behavior indicative of SSRF exploitation attempts.