CVE-2026-92990 in Newsletters Plugin
Summary
by MITRE • 10/09/2026
The SendPress Newsletters WordPress plugin through 1.26.1.20 protects a logging endpoint with a hardcoded token that is the same on every site rather than a per-site secret, allowing unauthenticated users to read newsletter sending logs, including recipient email addresses.
If you want to get best quality of vulnerability data, you may have to visit VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/09/2026
The vulnerability identified in SendPress Newsletters WordPress plugin versions through 1.26.1.20 represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms for sensitive administrative endpoints. The core technical flaw lies in the implementation of authentication logic for the logging endpoint, which relies on a hardcoded token that remains static across all installations rather than being dynamically generated or unique to each specific WordPress site instance. This architectural decision fundamentally undermines the security model by assuming that obscurity is sufficient protection, ignoring the reality that such tokens are easily discoverable through source code analysis or network traffic interception. By failing to implement per-site secrets, the plugin exposes a universal key that allows any unauthenticated actor with knowledge of this static token to bypass intended access restrictions and interact directly with internal logging functions without valid credentials.
From an operational perspective, this misconfiguration leads to severe information disclosure consequences. The primary impact is the ability for remote attackers to read newsletter sending logs, which contain highly sensitive personally identifiable information including recipient email addresses. This exposure violates fundamental privacy principles and data protection regulations such as GDPR or CCPA, depending on the jurisdiction of the affected organizations. Beyond individual privacy concerns, this vulnerability can facilitate further attacks by providing threat actors with a validated list of active user emails, which significantly enhances the effectiveness of targeted phishing campaigns like spear-phishing or business email compromise attempts. The availability of these logs effectively turns an internal debugging tool into a public-facing data repository for malicious purposes.
In terms of industry standard classifications, this vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, as it involves the use of static credentials that are not unique to each instance and cannot be changed by administrators without modifying code. Additionally, it falls under CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor due to improper access control mechanisms on sensitive data stores. From a tactical standpoint within the MITRE ATT&CK framework for enterprise environments, this behavior is consistent with T1530: Data from Cloud Storage Objects or more broadly with reconnaissance activities where attackers gather information about victim infrastructure and personnel through exposed APIs or endpoints. The lack of proper authentication checks allows unauthorized enumeration and extraction of data that should be restricted to authenticated administrators only.
Mitigation strategies must address both the immediate technical flaw and broader security hygiene practices. For organizations currently using vulnerable versions, the most effective remediation is to upgrade immediately to a patched version where this hardcoded token has been replaced with dynamic per-site authentication mechanisms or removed entirely if not strictly necessary for logging operations. Administrators should also audit their WordPress installations for any other plugins that might expose similar hard-coded secrets in API endpoints or administrative interfaces. In environments where immediate patching is not feasible, network-level controls such as Web Application Firewalls can be configured to block requests containing the known malicious token pattern to specific internal paths, although this serves only as a temporary compensating control rather than a permanent fix. Furthermore, developers should adhere to secure coding standards that mandate unique session tokens or API keys generated per installation using cryptographically secure random number generators, ensuring that compromise of one site does not lead to widespread exposure across the ecosystem.