CVE-2026-93983 in OpenPanel
Summary
by MITRE • 09/19/2026
OpenPanel through commit bad75bdd fails to escape property keys in ClickHouse SQL queries, allowing authenticated users to inject boolean SQL terms. Attackers can supply crafted filter names to bypass project isolation and access metrics from other projects.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/19/2026
The vulnerability identified in OpenPanel stems from a critical failure in input validation and sanitization mechanisms within the application's interaction with its underlying ClickHouse database. Specifically, the flaw resides in how property keys are handled during the construction of SQL queries. When authenticated users submit filter names or other property identifiers to be used as query parameters, the system fails to properly escape these values before embedding them into the SQL statement. This lack of proper escaping allows an attacker who has valid authentication credentials for a specific project to manipulate the structure of the database query itself rather than just its data payload. By injecting boolean logic terms directly into the property key field, the attacker can alter the logical flow and filtering criteria of the SQL command executed against ClickHouse.
This technical flaw effectively constitutes a classic case of SQL injection, categorized under CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command. The severity is compounded by the fact that it targets property keys rather than standard data fields, which often receive less rigorous scrutiny during development and testing phases. Because ClickHouse supports complex boolean operations within its query syntax, the injected terms can be crafted to bypass existing WHERE clauses or JOIN conditions designed to isolate data between different projects. This means that the logical boundaries enforced by the application layer are circumvented at the database layer, allowing for unauthorized access to sensitive information stored in separate project contexts.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant regarding confidentiality and integrity within multi-tenant environments. An authenticated attacker can exploit this flaw to bypass project isolation mechanisms, thereby accessing metrics, logs, or configuration data belonging to other projects on the same OpenPanel instance. This breach of tenant separation undermines the fundamental security model of SaaS platforms where data segregation is paramount for compliance with standards such as SOC 2 and ISO 27001. Furthermore, depending on the specific boolean logic injected, an attacker might be able to manipulate query results to cause denial-of-service conditions or extract large volumes of sensitive operational metrics that were not intended for their access level.
From a threat modeling perspective aligned with MITRE ATT&CK, this vulnerability facilitates techniques associated with Data from Information Repositories (T1213) and potentially Privilege Escalation if the extracted data reveals further weaknesses in user roles or permissions. The attack vector is classified as Local Network adjacent or Remote depending on whether OpenPanel exposes its interface to untrusted networks, but it strictly requires authentication, placing it within the context of authenticated attacks rather than remote code execution without prior access.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate remediation should focus on implementing strict parameterized queries for all database interactions involving user-supplied input. Even when property keys are dynamic and cannot be fully parameterized in some SQL dialects, they must undergo rigorous whitelisting validation to ensure they contain only expected alphanumeric characters or specific allowed symbols. Additionally, the principle of least privilege should be enforced at the database level by ensuring that the application's database user account does not have excessive permissions across all projects but is restricted strictly to its own schema or table partitions where possible. Regular security audits and static code analysis tools configured to detect SQL injection patterns are also recommended to prevent similar flaws in future development cycles.