CVE-2026-97679 in Langflow OSSinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 10/07/2026

IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.12.2 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command ('Code Injection') related to improper input validation.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 10/07/2026

The vulnerability identified in IBM Langflow versions 1.0.0 through 1.12.2 represents a critical security flaw rooted in the application's handling of user-supplied data within its code execution engine. As an open-source framework designed for building and deploying large language model applications, Langflow allows users to construct complex workflows involving various nodes that process input data. The specific weakness lies in how these nodes handle string inputs intended for dynamic code generation or script execution. When a remote authenticated attacker provides specially crafted input strings containing shell metacharacters such as semicolons, pipes, ampersands, or backticks, the application fails to adequately sanitize or escape these elements before passing them to the underlying operating system command interpreter. This failure constitutes an OS Command Injection vulnerability, technically classified under CWE-78 in the Common Weakness Enumeration standard. The root cause is a deficiency in input validation and output encoding mechanisms within the code execution modules, where user-controlled data is concatenated directly into shell commands without proper context-aware escaping or parameterization.

From an operational perspective, this flaw allows for severe consequences beyond simple information disclosure. Because the vulnerability enables arbitrary command execution on the host system running Langflow, a successful exploitation can lead to complete compromise of the underlying infrastructure. An attacker with authenticated access could execute administrative commands, install malicious software, exfiltrate sensitive data stored in local files or databases accessible by the application's runtime environment, or pivot further into other network segments if the server has broader connectivity. The impact is particularly acute because Langflow is often deployed in development and staging environments where security controls may be less stringent than in production, yet it frequently handles proprietary logic models and sensitive training data. Furthermore, since authentication is required to exploit this flaw, the threat actor must first gain valid credentials through phishing, credential stuffing, or other initial access techniques, which lowers the barrier for exploitation compared to unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerabilities but still poses a significant risk to organizations with weak identity management practices.

The technical mechanics of this attack involve injecting payload sequences that break out of the intended command context and introduce new commands into the shell pipeline. For instance, if an application node constructs a command like python script.py input_data, an attacker could supply input_data as ; rm -rf / to execute a destructive deletion command after the original script finishes running. Alternatively, using backticks or $() syntax allows for subshell execution where the output of one command can be fed into another, facilitating data exfiltration via DNS queries or HTTP requests to external servers controlled by the attacker. This behavior aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, specifically shell commands such as sh or bash, which are commonly abused in post-exploitation phases to maintain persistence or escalate privileges within compromised environments. The lack of strict allow-listing for input characters or the absence of using safe APIs that do not invoke a shell interpreter directly contributes to this vulnerability's existence.

Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The primary defense is to upgrade IBM Langflow to version 1.12.3 or later, where the vendor has implemented fixes for improper neutralization of special elements in OS commands. In addition to patching, organizations should enforce strict input validation policies that reject any user-supplied data containing shell metacharacters unless absolutely necessary and properly escaped using language-specific safe libraries rather than manual string manipulation. Implementing a Web Application Firewall with rules tuned to detect command injection patterns can provide an additional layer of defense in depth. Furthermore, adopting the principle of least privilege is crucial; Langflow should run under a dedicated service account with minimal permissions, ensuring that even if code execution occurs, the attacker cannot access critical system files or modify core application configurations. Regular security audits and static analysis scanning focused on CWE-78 patterns within custom nodes or extensions developed for Langflow will help prevent similar issues from being introduced in future deployments.

Responsible

Ibm

Reservation

09/24/2026

Disclosure

10/07/2026

Moderation

accepted

EPSS

0.00439

KEV

no

Activities

low

Sources

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