CVE-2026-97732 in Ironshield
Summary
by MITRE • 09/25/2026
IRONMACE Ironshield 1.0.0.167 has a tvk.sys kernel-mode driver that authenticates client executables by checking for expected publisher and root-certificate strings in WIN_CERTIFICATE data ("IRONMACE Co., Ltd." and "DigiCert Trusted Root G4") instead of parsing and validating the PKCS signature data. As a result, a local unprivileged attacker may bypass this via crafted certificate data and obtain access to privileged IOCTL functionality.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/25/2026
The vulnerability identified in IRONMACE Ironshield version 1.0.0.167 represents a critical failure in the implementation of code signing verification within its kernel-mode driver, tvk.sys. This component is responsible for authenticating client executables before granting them access to privileged Input/Output Control (IOCTL) functionality. The core technical flaw lies in how the driver validates digital signatures associated with these executables. Instead of performing a rigorous cryptographic validation by parsing and verifying the PKCS#7 signature data, which includes checking the certificate chain integrity, expiration status, revocation lists, and ensuring the signature matches the file content via hash verification, the driver employs a simplistic string-matching approach. Specifically, it inspects the WIN_CERTIFICATE structure embedded within the executable for specific hardcoded strings indicating the expected publisher name "IRONMACE Co., Ltd." and the root certificate authority "DigiCert Trusted Root G4". This method fundamentally bypasses the actual cryptographic proof of authenticity, relying solely on metadata presence rather than mathematical verification.
This architectural weakness allows a local unprivileged attacker to craft malicious executable files that contain forged or manipulated WIN_CERTIFICATE structures containing the expected strings without possessing the private keys required to generate valid PKCS signatures. By embedding these specific text identifiers into the certificate data section of a custom-built binary, an attacker can trick the tvk.sys driver into believing the application is legitimately signed by IRONMACE and trusted through DigiCert. Consequently, the security boundary enforced by the kernel-mode driver is effectively neutralized for any executable that successfully mimics these metadata fields. This constitutes a classic example of insecure verification logic where superficial checks replace robust cryptographic validation, leading to a complete bypass of authentication mechanisms designed to restrict access to sensitive system resources.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its location within kernel-mode code and the nature of the privileged IOCTL functionality it protects. Kernel-mode drivers operate with ring 0 privileges, granting them unrestricted access to hardware and memory spaces that user-mode applications cannot directly interact with. By bypassing the authentication check, an attacker can invoke these IOCTLs from a standard, unprivileged user account. This escalation allows for potential arbitrary code execution within kernel space, which typically leads to full system compromise. An adversary could leverage this pathway to install rootkits, disable security software, extract sensitive data such as encryption keys or credentials stored in memory, or modify critical system configurations. The ability to execute privileged operations without proper authentication undermines the integrity and confidentiality of the entire operating environment protected by Ironshield.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-287: Improper Authentication, specifically involving weak credential verification mechanisms that rely on static strings rather than cryptographic proofs. It also relates closely to CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity, as the system fails to verify that the data (the executable) actually corresponds to the claimed identity via digital signature validation. In terms of attack vectors and tactics, this flaw facilitates privilege escalation through local exploitation techniques documented in MITRE ATT&CK under T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. Attackers would likely utilize custom-built tools or scripts to generate PE files with manipulated certificate sections, leveraging the driver's logic error to gain elevated permissions without detection by standard security monitoring that focuses on signature validity rather than structural anomalies in certificate data fields.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The most effective solution is for IRONMACE to release a patched version of Ironshield that updates the tvk.sys driver to implement proper PKCS#7 signature verification. This involves using standard cryptographic APIs to validate the digital signature against the file's hash, verify the certificate chain up to a trusted root store, check for revocation status via CRL or OCSP, and ensure the signing time is within valid bounds. Until an official patch is available, administrators should restrict execution of untrusted binaries through application whitelisting solutions that operate at a level independent of this specific driver's logic. Additionally, enabling advanced endpoint detection and response (EDR) capabilities can help monitor for unusual IOCTL calls originating from non-standard or unsigned processes, providing a layer of behavioral defense against exploitation attempts while the underlying vulnerability remains present in older versions of the software.