CVE-2026-99362 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 11/19/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: preflight SEQUENCE replies before accepting a slot
nfsd4_sequence() narrows the reply buffer to the session's cached reply limit before it accepts the slot seqid. A client may negotiate ca_maxresponsesize_cached down to NFSD_MIN_HDR_SEQ_SZ, and nfsd4_alloc_slot() then gives every slot a zero-length sl_data[]. A
COMPOUND tag can fill that narrowed buffer until it holds the SEQUENCE opcode but not the status word that follows. nfsd4_encode_operation() returns without running nfsd4_encode_sequence(), so cstate.data_offset stays zero. It leaves op->status at nfs_ok as well, so the COMPOUND is treated as having succeeded.
nfsd4_store_cache_entry() declines to cache a lone SEQUENCE that returned an error. That test reads the status the operation reported, so it passes here. The copy starts at offset zero and takes the whole reply, RPC and COMPOUND headers included, into the zero-length sl_data[]. The COMPOUND tag is copied along with it, so
the client picks most of the bytes written past the end of the slot:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390 Write of size 80 at addr ffff888003a549cd by task kunit_try_catch/24 __asan_memcpy+0x38/0x60 read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390 nfsd4_sequence_done+0x5b0/0x810 nfs4svc_encode_compoundres+0x1bf/0x240
Check that the fixed-size SEQUENCE result, plus room for a following operation's error status, fits the negotiated limit before narrowing the buffer and consuming the slot seqid. The slot and its reply cache are left unchanged, as RFC 8881 Section 2.10.6.1.2 requires of an error returned from SEQUENCE.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/22/2026
The vulnerability in question resides within the Network File System daemon (nfsd) component of the Linux kernel, specifically affecting the NFSv4 protocol implementation's handling of session sequences and reply caching mechanisms. The core issue stems from a logic flaw in how nfsd4_sequence() manages buffer allocation and slot acceptance relative to negotiated client capabilities. When an NFSv4 client initiates a connection or establishes a session, it negotiates parameters including ca_maxresponsesize_cached, which defines the maximum size of cached replies for that specific session. In this vulnerability scenario, a malicious or misconfigured client can negotiate this value down to NFSD_MIN_HDR_SEQ_SZ, effectively minimizing the available space for reply data. The nfsd4_alloc_slot() function subsequently assigns each slot in the session with a zero-length sl_data array based on this narrowed limit. This creates a precarious state where subsequent operations must fit within an extremely constrained buffer space.
The operational impact of this flaw manifests when a client sends a COMPOUND request that contains only a SEQUENCE opcode. The NFSv4 protocol requires that every operation be followed by its status word, indicating success or failure. However, because the reply buffer has been narrowed to the minimum size required for the SEQUENCE header itself, there is insufficient space to accommodate both the SEQUENCE result and the mandatory following status field. Consequently, nfsd4_encode_operation() completes without executing nfsd4_encode_sequence(), leaving cstate.data_offset at zero. Crucially, because no encoding error occurred during this truncated process, op->status remains set to nfs_ok, leading the kernel to incorrectly treat the COMPOUND request as successfully completed despite the incomplete response structure.
This incorrect status determination triggers a critical memory safety violation in the subsequent caching phase. The function nfsd4_store_cache_entry() is designed to cache replies that return errors, but it relies on reading the operation's reported status to make this decision. Since the status was erroneously set to success due to the encoding flaw, the check passes, and the system attempts to store the reply in the slot's data buffer. The copy operation begins at offset zero and attempts to write the entire reply structure, including RPC and COMPOUND headers, into the sl_data array which has a length of zero. This results in a slab-out-of-bounds memory write, as evidenced by KASAN reports indicating writes past the end of the allocated slot buffer. Such out-of-bounds writes can lead to kernel panics, data corruption, or potentially be exploited for arbitrary code execution depending on the surrounding memory layout and attacker control over adjacent structures.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write, as it involves writing data beyond the allocated boundaries of a buffer in kernel space. It also relates to CWE-20: Improper Input Validation, specifically regarding the failure to validate that the negotiated response size is sufficient for all required protocol fields before committing resources like slot sequence IDs. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this flaw could be leveraged within the context of Initial Access or Defense Evasion if an attacker uses it to cause a denial of service through kernel crashes, or potentially as part of a broader exploitation chain targeting remote code execution via memory corruption in privileged contexts.
The resolution involves modifying nfsd4_sequence() to perform preflight checks on reply sizes before accepting a slot's sequence identifier. The fix ensures that the fixed-size SEQUENCE result, along with sufficient room for any following operation's error status, fits within the negotiated limit prior to narrowing the buffer and consuming the seqid. If the space is insufficient, the slot and its associated reply cache are left unchanged, adhering strictly to RFC 8881 Section 2.10.6.1.2 requirements which dictate that errors returned from SEQUENCE operations should not consume slots or alter session state in a way that implies successful processing. This preventive measure ensures that resources are only committed when the protocol can be fully and correctly executed, thereby eliminating the condition that leads to buffer overflows.
To mitigate this vulnerability, system administrators must ensure that their Linux kernels are updated with patches addressing this nfsd flaw. For environments where immediate patching is not feasible, restricting NFSv4 client access or monitoring for unusual negotiation patterns involving minimal response sizes can provide some level of defense in depth. Additionally, enabling kernel hardening features such as KASAN (Kernel Address Sanitizer) in development and testing environments helps detect these types of memory corruption issues early in the software lifecycle before they reach production systems. Regular auditing of NFS server configurations against RFC 8881 compliance ensures that edge cases involving buffer limits are handled robustly, preventing similar logic errors from being exploited by malicious actors seeking to destabilize network file services or escalate privileges within the host system.