CVE-2026-134458 in jwt-frameworkinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/21/2026

web-token jwt-framework and jwt-library before 3.4.12, 4.0.x before 4.0.8, 4.1.x before 4.1.10, and 4.2.x before 4.2.4, and jwt-encryption-algorithm-ecdh-es through 3.2.10, have a ConcatKDF::generate() that performs a single SHA-256 round, deriving at most 32 bytes for ECDH-ES and ECDH-SS direct key agreement. Anyone holding a JWE using A256CBC-HS512 can decrypt it under an all-zero AES key, while A192CBC-HS384 content keys have only 64-bit strength.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/21/2026

The identified vulnerability resides within the web-token library ecosystem, specifically affecting jwt-framework and jwt-library versions prior to 3.4.12, as well as specific branches of version 4 including 4.0.x before 4.0.8, 4.1.x before 4.1.10, and 4.2.x before 4.2.4. Additionally, the jwt-encryption-algorithm-ecdh-es component through version 3.2.10 is impacted by this flaw. The core technical deficiency lies in the implementation of the ConcatKDF::generate() function used for key derivation during Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) based encryption schemes such as ECDH-ES and ECDH-SS direct key agreement protocols. In a secure cryptographic system, key derivation functions must produce output with entropy proportional to the security strength of the underlying algorithm. However, this implementation performs only a single SHA-256 hash round when deriving keys for these algorithms. This design choice fundamentally limits the derived key material to at most 32 bytes, which is insufficient for maintaining the intended security margins in modern cryptographic contexts where higher entropy is required to prevent brute-force or statistical attacks.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and directly compromises the confidentiality of encrypted JSON Web Tokens (JWE). For tokens utilizing the A256CBC-HS512 content encryption algorithm, which theoretically requires a 256-bit AES key for full security strength, the flawed derivation process allows an attacker who possesses knowledge of certain parameters or can manipulate inputs to decrypt the payload using an all-zero AES key. This represents a catastrophic failure in confidentiality controls, as it effectively nullifies the encryption protection provided by the algorithm. The cryptographic integrity is not necessarily broken in terms of authentication if the MAC verification remains robust, but the primary purpose of JWE encryption is defeated because the ciphertext can be decrypted without possessing the correct derived secret.

For implementations using the A192CBC-HS384 content encryption algorithm, the vulnerability results in a significant reduction of effective security strength. Although AES-192 nominally offers 192-bit security, the flawed key derivation mechanism reduces the actual entropy available to the cipher to approximately 64 bits. This drastic weakening exposes the encrypted data to feasible brute-force attacks using modern computational resources. An adversary can exhaustively search the reduced keyspace with high probability of success in a reasonable timeframe, thereby rendering the encryption ineffective against determined attackers. This scenario exemplifies how improper implementation of cryptographic primitives can lead to security levels far below their theoretical specifications.

From an industry standards perspective, this vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-328, which describes the use of weak hash functions for key derivation or integrity verification where stronger alternatives are available and required by context. It also relates to CWE-757, concerning the selection of cryptographic algorithms that provide insufficient confidentiality due to implementation flaws rather than algorithmic weaknesses per se. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this flaw facilitates Initial Access through compromised credentials if tokens are used for authentication, as attackers can decrypt sensitive payloads or impersonate users by exploiting the weakened key derivation. It also impacts Confidentiality under the Impact category, specifically Data Encrypted in Transit being exposed due to weak cryptographic protections.

Mitigation strategies require immediate upgrading of all affected components within the web-token ecosystem. Organizations must ensure that jwt-framework and jwt-library are updated to versions 3.4.12 or later for version 3.x, and corresponding patch releases for version 4 branches as specified above. The jwt-encryption-algorithm-ecdh-es component should also be upgraded to at least version 3.2.10 if it is still below that threshold, though newer versions are preferred. Developers implementing these libraries must verify that the key derivation functions adhere to NIST SP 800-56C recommendations for deriving keys from shared secrets, ensuring sufficient iterations or hash rounds to maintain full entropy. Regular security audits and dependency scanning should be employed to detect such vulnerabilities in third-party cryptographic libraries before deployment into production environments.

Responsible

VulnCheck

Reservation

11/21/2026

Disclosure

11/21/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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