CVE-2026-134451 in Dockhand
Summary
by MITRE • 11/21/2026
Dockhand before 1.0.57 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability that allows non-admin users with settings:edit permission to modify OIDC provider configuration due to an improper permission check. Attackers can send a PUT request to /api/auth/oidc/<provider-id> setting adminClaim to their own OIDC group, gaining full admin access on their next OIDC login.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/21/2026
The vulnerability identified in Dockhand versions prior to 1.0.57 represents a critical authorization failure that enables privilege escalation within the application's authentication subsystem. This flaw specifically targets the OpenID Connect (OIDC) provider configuration endpoints, which are designed to manage identity integration for user authentication and access control. The core technical issue stems from an improper permission check implemented in the backend logic handling PUT requests to the /api/auth/oidc/<provider-id> endpoint. While the application correctly restricts general administrative actions to users with admin privileges, it fails to enforce this restriction on specific configuration parameters that directly influence identity mapping and role assignment. Consequently, any user possessing the settings:edit permission, a lower-privilege role intended for managing non-critical application settings, can interact with these sensitive endpoints without adequate verification of their authority level.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it allows an attacker to escalate from a standard user account to full administrative access. By exploiting the flawed authorization logic, an authenticated user can send a crafted PUT request that modifies the OIDC provider configuration. Specifically, the attacker sets the adminClaim parameter to correspond with their own OIDC group or role identifier defined in their external identity provider. This manipulation effectively tells Dockhand to treat any user belonging to that specific OIDC group as an administrator upon subsequent authentication events. Once this configuration change is applied and persisted by the server, the attacker can log out and then log back in using their standard credentials associated with the manipulated OIDC group. Upon successful re-authentication, the application grants them full administrative privileges based on the altered claim mapping.
This type of vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-269, which classifies Improper Privilege Assignment, as well as CWE-862, Missing Authorization Check, because the system fails to verify that the user has the necessary rights for the specific action being performed. From a tactical perspective, this exploit maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts, where an adversary uses legitimate credentials to gain access, and specifically relates to privilege escalation methods such as T1548, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism, by manipulating configuration settings that control role assignments. The ability to modify OIDC configurations highlights a broader architectural weakness in how the application separates concerns between general setting management and security-critical identity provider configurations.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations running Dockhand must immediately upgrade to version 1.0.57 or later, where these permission checks have been corrected to properly validate administrative privileges for all OIDC configuration changes. In environments where immediate patching is not feasible, administrators should restrict the settings:edit permission to only those users who truly require it and ensure that no non-administrative accounts possess this role by default. Additionally, implementing strict input validation and ensuring that sensitive configuration endpoints are protected by multi-factor authentication or additional authorization layers can provide defense-in-depth against such exploitation attempts. Regular auditing of OIDC provider configurations and monitoring for unusual changes to identity mapping settings can also help detect potential abuse before full administrative access is established.