CVE-2026-99495 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 11/19/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Fix and improve zcrypt reply message verification checks
Add or improve checks related to buffer sizes and reply sizes to the handling of replies from the crypto cards for CCA, EP11 (AP message type 6) and ICA (AP type 50) messages. The verification code related to reply field length was not designed well and thus firmware deficiencies could lead to unexpected behavior in the zcrypt device driver. Thus improve the code to more closely inspect especially length fields at message replies.
Add length validation before accessing reply message structures in zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(), zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11(), and zcrypt_msgtype50_receive() to prevent out-of-bounds reads and potential kernel memory disclosure.
Also rework these three functions to validate reply lengths more carefully before copying data back into the request buffer. Use size_t for length calculations, reject inconsistent reply sizes, and add defensive handling for short invalid replies. For XCRB replies, validate both reply segments and derive the effective message length from the covered range instead of trusting only the second segment.
Additionally improve some of the later invoked evaluation functions which further check the payload. Add comments about length assumptions and for the type50 processing rework the payload processing completely with removing a misplaced BUG_ON().
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026
The Linux kernel's s390 zcrypt subsystem has addressed critical security flaws related to insufficient validation of reply messages received from cryptographic hardware accelerators, specifically those supporting CCA, EP11, and ICA protocols. This vulnerability stems from inadequate verification of buffer sizes and reply message lengths within the driver code responsible for handling AP message types 6 and 50. The original implementation relied on assumptions about firmware behavior that proved unreliable in edge cases where hardware or firmware defects produced malformed responses. These deficiencies allowed attackers to trigger unexpected behaviors by supplying crafted inputs that exploit the lack of rigorous boundary checks, potentially leading to out-of-bounds memory reads and subsequent kernel memory disclosure.
The core technical flaw lies in the handling of reply message structures within functions such as zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(), zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11(), and zcrypt_msgtype50_receive(). Previously, these routines did not sufficiently validate that the length fields contained within the hardware replies were consistent with the actual data available. This oversight meant that if a crypto card returned a reply with an inconsistent or excessively large size field, the driver could proceed to access memory regions beyond the allocated buffer boundaries. Such out-of-bounds reads constitute a significant information leak vulnerability, as they may expose sensitive kernel memory contents to unauthorized processes or userspace applications interacting with the cryptographic device interface.
To remediate this issue, developers have implemented comprehensive length validation checks prior to any access of reply message structures. The updated code now utilizes size_t for all length calculations to prevent integer overflow issues and ensures that both segments of XCRB replies are validated rather than trusting only the second segment. By deriving the effective message length from the covered range instead of blindly accepting reported sizes, the driver can reject inconsistent or short invalid replies before they cause harm. This defensive programming approach includes rejecting messages where the payload size does not align with expected constraints, thereby neutralizing attempts to exploit malformed inputs for memory disclosure attacks.
Beyond immediate buffer safety improvements, the patch also refactors later invoked evaluation functions that further inspect the payload data. Comments have been added to clarify length assumptions and processing logic, enhancing maintainability and future security audits. Notably, in type50 processing, a misplaced BUG_ON() macro was removed during the rework of payload handling. This change prevents potential denial-of-service scenarios where an invalid reply could trigger a kernel panic instead of being gracefully rejected as an error condition. The removal of this aggressive assertion ensures system stability while maintaining strict security controls over input validation.
From a classification perspective, these vulnerabilities align with CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read and CWE-20 Improper Input Validation. In the context of the MITRE ATT&CK framework for Linux systems, this relates to techniques involving data from cloud or infrastructure components where improper handling of external inputs leads to information discovery. The fix ensures that the zcrypt driver adheres to secure coding standards by validating all external data sources before processing. System administrators should apply kernel updates containing these patches immediately to mitigate risks associated with local privilege escalation via memory disclosure or denial-of-service through crash induction on affected s390 architectures utilizing cryptographic accelerators.