CVE-2026-99563 in Linuxinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/19/2026

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: smbdirect: release failed pending sockets of a listener

A child of a listener only left the listen.pending or listen.ready list via smbdirect_socket_accept() or when the listener was destroyed. So every connection that failed before it was accepted (negotiate timeout, peer disconnect, invalid negotiate request, ...) stayed on the list and counted against the backlog until the listener was destroyed. After about backlog (10 for ksmbd) such connections smbdirect_listen_connect_request() rejected every new connection with -EBUSY, so an unauthenticated peer was able to permanently stop ksmbd from accepting SMB-Direct connections.

Now a failed child moves itself to a new listen.orphaned list at the end of smbdirect_socket_cleanup_work(), after the disconnect was started, and queues listen.purge_orphaned_work, which releases it with smbdirect_socket_release(), without holding the listener's rdma_lock_handler() lock, in the same way smbdirect_socket_destroy() does for the remaining children. Orphaned sockets still count against the backlog until they are released.

sc->accept.listener is now only changed under listener->listen.lock and whoever clears it is responsible for releasing the socket: smbdirect_socket_accept(), purge_orphaned_work or the destroy of the listener.

In order to make that work:

- a struct smbdirect_socket that is a listener is now freed via kfree_rcu(), so that a child can dereference sc->accept.listener under rcu_read_lock(), even if the listener is released concurrently.

- smbdirect_listen_connect_request() adds nsc to the listen.pending list and sets nsc->accept.listener before it calls smbdirect_accept_connect_request(), and always returns 0 so the rdma_cm core keeps the connection id and nsc owns it. On a non-zero return it schedules nsc's teardown with smbdirect_socket_schedule_cleanup(), which orphans it off the listener so that purge_orphaned_work releases it; nsc destroys its own connection id with rdma_destroy_id() in that teardown. The teardown has to be deferred because the rdma_cm core holds nsc's id_priv->handler_mutex across the handler, so nsc->rdma.cm_id must not be destroyed synchronously from here. That same handler_mutex (and the listener's) also guarantees nsc can't go away under us, so setting the listener before the call is safe and lets a failure orphan nsc.

- smbdirect_accept_negotiate_recv_work() no longer moves a socket to the ready list if it already failed or no longer belongs to the listener. Every accepting socket has a listener, so if sc->accept.listener is already cleared, it no longer sends a negotiate response, as the socket is about to be released.

- smbdirect_socket_destroy() of the listener disables purge_orphaned_work and also releases the orphaned sockets.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026

The Linux kernel vulnerability in the SMB Direct (SMB-Direct) subsystem represents a resource management flaw that allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service against ksmbd services utilizing RDMA capabilities. The core issue stems from how pending socket connections are tracked and cleaned up within the listener structure. Previously, child sockets associated with a listener remained on either the listen.pending or listen.ready lists until they were explicitly accepted via smbdirect_socket_accept() or until the parent listener was destroyed. This design failed to account for connection failures that occurred prior to acceptance, such as negotiate timeouts, peer disconnections, or invalid negotiation requests. Consequently, these failed connections persisted in memory and continued to consume backlog slots indefinitely. Once the number of pending sockets reached the configured backlog limit, which is set to ten by default for ksmbd, the system would reject all new incoming connection attempts with an -EBUSY error code. This effectively rendered the SMB-Direct service unresponsive to legitimate clients, creating a persistent denial-of-service condition that could be triggered without any authentication credentials.

The technical root cause lies in the lifecycle management of smbdirect_socket structures and their relationship with the listener object. The original implementation did not provide a mechanism for failed sockets to remove themselves from the active tracking lists when they encountered errors during the connection establishment phase. This led to resource exhaustion where the backlog counter was artificially inflated by stale, non-functional connections. The vulnerability exploits this logic gap, allowing an attacker to flood the service with half-open or immediately failing connections until the backlog is saturated. By doing so, the attacker prevents any new valid sessions from being established, effectively halting file sharing operations that rely on SMB-Direct for high-performance data transfer over RDMA networks. This aligns with CWE-400, which describes uncontrolled resource consumption, and can be mapped to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1499, Endpoint Denial of Service, specifically under the sub-category of Resource Exhaustion: Application or System Services.

The resolution involves a comprehensive restructuring of how sockets are orphaned, tracked, and released. The fix introduces a new listen.orphaned list that captures failed child sockets at the end of smbdirect_socket_cleanup_work(), after the disconnect process has been initiated but before final release. These orphaned sockets are then processed by listen.purge_orphaned_work, which calls smbdirect_socket_release() to free resources without holding the listener's rdma_lock_handler lock, mirroring the behavior used during listener destruction. This ensures that failed connections no longer block new ones from entering the pending state. Furthermore, access to sc->accept.listener is now strictly controlled under listener->listen.lock, ensuring thread safety and preventing race conditions where a socket might reference a freed listener object. To support this concurrent dereferencing safely, listener structures are now freed using kfree_rcu(), allowing child sockets to read the listener pointer within an RCU read-side critical section even if the parent is being destroyed concurrently.

Additional changes in smbdirect_listen_connect_request() ensure that new connections are properly tracked and managed from the outset. The function adds the new socket to listen.pending and sets its accept.listener reference before initiating the connection request, guaranteeing ownership by the rdma_cm core. If the connection attempt fails, the socket is scheduled for teardown via smbdirect_socket_schedule_cleanup(), which moves it to the orphaned list for eventual release rather than leaving it in a limbo state. This deferred teardown approach respects the mutex constraints of the rdma_cm core, preventing deadlocks or use-after-free errors that could arise from synchronous destruction during handler execution. Similarly, smbdirect_accept_negotiate_recv_work() was updated to check if a socket has already failed or lost its listener association before attempting further negotiation steps, ensuring that resources are not wasted on sockets destined for release. Finally, the listener destroy routine now explicitly disables orphan purging and handles the final cleanup of remaining orphaned sockets, closing all potential paths for resource leakage.

Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability primarily involve applying the latest kernel patches provided by distribution vendors to ensure the SMB-Direct subsystem is updated with these fixes. Organizations relying on ksmbd should verify that their systems are running patched versions of the Linux kernel where smbdirect_socket_cleanup_work and related functions have been modified to handle orphaned sockets correctly. In environments where RDMA-based file sharing is not strictly required, disabling SMB Direct support can reduce the attack surface by removing the vulnerable code path entirely. Additionally, monitoring for unusual spikes in connection attempts or backlog saturation metrics on servers running ksmbd can help detect potential exploitation attempts early. Security teams should also ensure that network segmentation policies limit exposure of RDMA-enabled services to trusted networks only, reducing the risk of unauthenticated actors attempting to exhaust resources through rapid connection initiation and immediate termination patterns characteristic of this denial-of-service vector.

Responsible

Linux

Reservation

09/25/2026

Disclosure

11/19/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00155

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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