CVE-2026-99690 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 11/20/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: cache the mount context for dentry lock callbacks
ocfs2_drop_dentry_lock() drops the inode reference before releasing the DENTRY lock. This lets inode eviction release the local inode and open locks before a remote unlink can proceed past the DENTRY lock.
A DLM callback can still arrive before the DENTRY lock has been dropped. ocfs2_get_dentry_osb() obtains the mount context through dl_inode->i_sb, which can access a freed inode when the downconvert thread drops the last inode reference in its post-unlock callback:
Downconvert thread DLM callback thread ------------------ ------------------- ocfs2_process_blocked_lock() ocfs2_dentry_post_unlock() ocfs2_dentry_lock_put() ocfs2_drop_dentry_lock() iput(dl->dl_inode) [inode reclaimed after RCU]
ocfs2_blocking_ast() ocfs2_get_dentry_osb() dl->dl_inode->i_sb ocfs2_simple_drop_lockres()
Store the mount context in the DENTRY lock resource's l_priv field and use the default mount-context lookup. Recover the containing dentry lock with container_of(), as already done for refcount locks, and remove ocfs2_get_dentry_osb(). ocfs2_dismount_volume() shuts down the DLM before freeing the mount context, so callbacks can use it without accessing the inode. Preserve the existing iput-before-unlock order to avoid delaying local inode and open lock release until after the DENTRY lock is released.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026
The vulnerability identified in the Linux kernel's OCFS2 filesystem driver involves a race condition within the distributed locking mechanism that can lead to use-after-free errors and potential system instability or crashes. The core technical flaw resides in the sequence of operations performed when dropping dentry locks, specifically within the ocfs2_drop_dentry_lock function. In this routine, the inode reference is released before the DENTRY lock itself is fully relinquished. This ordering creates a window where an inode eviction process can release local inode and open locks prior to the completion of a remote unlink operation that depends on holding the DENTRY lock. Consequently, the system enters a state where critical resources are freed while they may still be referenced by ongoing distributed locking operations.
The operational impact is most severe when a Distributed Lock Manager callback arrives before the DENTRY lock has been completely dropped. The function ocfs2_get_dentry_osb attempts to retrieve the mount context by accessing the superblock pointer within the inode structure, specifically through dl_inode->i_sb. However, because the downconvert thread may drop the last reference to the inode in its post-unlock callback, the inode can be reclaimed via RCU mechanisms before this access occurs. This results in a use-after-free scenario where the code attempts to dereference memory that has already been freed or is in the process of being deallocated. The race condition involves two concurrent threads: one handling the downconversion and lock release, which triggers iput on the dentry lock inode, and another thread processing DLM callbacks that attempt to access this now-invalid inode pointer to retrieve mount context information.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-416, Use After Free, as it involves accessing memory after it has been freed due to improper synchronization of resource lifecycles. From a threat modeling perspective using the MITRE ATT&CK framework, such kernel-level race conditions can be leveraged for privilege escalation or denial of service attacks by triggering kernel panics or corrupting memory structures. The flaw highlights the complexity of managing reference counts and lock states in distributed filesystems where local operations must synchronize with remote node activities through a Distributed Lock Manager.
The resolution involves restructuring how mount context is accessed during dentry lock callbacks to eliminate dependency on potentially freed inode structures. Instead of retrieving the superblock from the inode, which risks accessing reclaimed memory, the fix stores the mount context directly in the l_priv field of the DENTRY lock resource. This ensures that the necessary context remains valid throughout the lifecycle of the lock regardless of inode reference counts. The implementation utilizes container_of to recover the containing dentry lock structure, a pattern already established for refcount locks within the codebase, thereby removing the need for the now-obsolete ocfs2_get_dentry_osb function. Furthermore, the shutdown sequence in ocfs2_dismount_volume is adjusted to ensure that DLM operations are terminated before the mount context is freed, guaranteeing that no callbacks can access invalid memory during volume teardown. The fix also preserves the existing order of iput preceding unlock to maintain efficient release of local inode and open locks without introducing unnecessary delays caused by waiting for dentry lock release.