CVE-2026-99691 in Linuxinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/20/2026

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2/cluster: unlink socket containers before releasing resources

A socket container's node and socket must remain alive while the container is on sock_containers. The debugfs formatter reads sc_node and sc_sock under o2net_debug_lock without taking their references, but sc_kref_release() releases both before taking that lock to unlink the container.

With CONFIG_DEBUG_FS enabled, a synchronous sender can retain its last socket-container reference after o2net_disconnect_node() has detached the connection and flushed o2net_wq. The caller runs outside that workqueue. After the sender removes its configfs dependency, node removal can proceed without waiting for the sender's final sc_put():

Sender (final sc_put) Configfs rmdir Debugfs reader -------------------- -------------- -------------- o2nm_undepend_item() Drop node item refs o2nm_node_put() [node can be freed]
sc_seq_show() Lock debug lock Read sc_node->nd_name Unlock debug lock sc_node = NULL o2net_debug_del_sc()

The earlier socket release has a similar window. The container is still selectable while its socket has been released and sc_sock has not yet been cleared:

Sender (final sc_put) Debugfs reader -------------------- -------------- sock_release(sc->sc_sock) [socket can be freed]
sc_seq_show() Lock debug lock Read sc_sock->sk fields Unlock debug lock sc_sock = NULL ... o2net_debug_del_sc()

Move o2net_debug_del_sc() before releasing either resource. Unlinking under the existing debug lock waits for an active formatter to finish and prevents later readers from selecting the container. This covers both socket fields and node fields, including nd_num in the stats formatter.

KASAN report as below:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in string+0x42b/0x470 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810f56fc90 by task python3/506

CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 506 Comm: python3 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-ocfs2-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0 print_report+0xce/0x630 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 string+0x42b/0x470 vsnprintf+0x330/0x1110 seq_printf+0x1a8/0x260 sc_seq_show+0x604/0x9f0 seq_read_iter+0x480/0x1110 seq_read+0x362/0x5a0 full_proxy_read+0x11f/0x180 vfs_read+0x1a0/0xc20 ksys_read+0x111/0x200 do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

(User register dump omitted.)

</TASK>

Allocated by task 497: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x28d/0x610 o2nm_node_group_make_item+0xea/0x1a0 configfs_mkdir+0x762/0xca0 vfs_mkdir+0x399/0x7e0 filename_mkdirat+0x129/0x450 __x64_sys_mkdir+0x70/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Freed by task 505: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 kfree+0x308/0x580 config_item_cleanup+0x14b/0x230 config_item_put+0x79/0x90 sc_put+0x454/0x6e0 o2net_send_message_vec+0x63d/0x1560 o2net_send_message+0xa6/0xe0 validation_send_write+0x17f/0x1d0 full_proxy_write+0x11f/0x180 vfs_write+0x25a/0x1010 ksys_write+ ---truncated---

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/21/2026

The vulnerability identified in the Linux kernel's OCFS2 cluster stack involves a use-after-free condition within the network socket container management logic, specifically triggered when debugfs is enabled. The core technical flaw lies in an incorrect ordering of operations during resource cleanup. When a synchronous sender releases its final reference to a socket container via sc_put(), it proceeds to release both the underlying node and socket resources before unlinking the container from the global sock_containers list under o2net_debug_lock. This sequence creates a critical race window where debugfs formatters, which read fields such as sc_node and sc_sock without holding additional references or locks beyond the brief acquisition of o2net_debug_lock, can access memory that has already been freed or is in the process of being deallocated. The vulnerability arises because the container remains selectable by readers during this interval, allowing a debugfs reader to acquire the lock, read stale pointers, and subsequently dereference them after they have become invalid due to concurrent resource release.

The operational impact manifests as kernel crashes detected via Kernel Address Sanitizer (KASAN) reports indicating slab-use-after-free errors. In practical scenarios, an unprivileged user or process with access to debugfs can trigger this condition by reading specific OCFS2 cluster statistics while a node is being disconnected and its associated socket containers are being cleaned up. The provided KASAN trace illustrates a read operation occurring at address ffff88810f56fc90, which corresponds to memory that was previously allocated for the container but has since been freed by another task handling the disconnection process. This leads to system instability, potential denial of service through kernel panic, and in worst-case scenarios, could allow an attacker to exploit the corrupted state for arbitrary code execution if the use-after-free can be precisely controlled to overwrite critical data structures. The vulnerability affects systems where CONFIG_DEBUG_FS is enabled, which is common in development environments but also present in some production kernels that retain debugging capabilities.

From a security standards perspective, this flaw aligns with CWE-416: Use After Free, as the code accesses memory after it has been freed, leading to undefined behavior and potential exploitation. It also relates to CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization, specifically regarding race conditions in multi-threaded kernel environments where lock ordering and reference counting are not strictly enforced during teardown sequences. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework for Enterprise or ICS, this vulnerability facilitates Initial Access via exploitation of a local privilege escalation vector if an attacker can trigger the condition to gain root access through a kernel panic exploit chain, or it contributes to Availability impact by causing system crashes. The specific interaction between configfs removal and debugfs reading highlights a failure in maintaining object lifetime guarantees across different subsystems within the kernel.

The resolution involves reordering the cleanup sequence so that o2net_debug_del_sc() is called before releasing either the socket or node resources. By unlinking the container from sock_containers while holding o2net_debug_lock, the fix ensures that no new readers can select the container for inspection until it has been fully removed from the active list. Existing readers are allowed to finish their current operations safely because they hold the lock during access, but once unlocked, subsequent attempts to read will fail or return empty results rather than accessing freed memory. This approach effectively closes the race window by ensuring that the object is logically invisible to debugfs consumers before its physical resources are reclaimed. Mitigation for systems where patching is not immediately possible includes disabling CONFIG_DEBUG_FS if it is enabled in production environments, as this removes the attack surface entirely. Additionally, restricting access to debugfs mounts via mount options or filesystem permissions can limit exposure until a kernel update is applied.

Responsible

Linux

Reservation

09/25/2026

Disclosure

11/20/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00168

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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