CVE-2026-99795 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 11/20/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/features: Ensure that count is set before access to ent[] __counted_by()
get_supported_features() assigns entries->num_features only after the memcpy() loop that fills entries->ent[] has already run. Since ent[]
is __counted_by(num_features), the compiler's bounds instrumentation sees a 0-length array during that loop and FORTIFY_SOURCE trips on the memcpy. Set @num_features right after allocation, before any write into ent[], so the bound is correct for the whole lifetime of
the array.
This was found via a fortify panic:
memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 384 byte write of buffer size 0 WARNING: lib/string_helpers.c:1035 at __fortify_report+0x54/0xa0 kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1043! Call trace: __fortify_panic+0x10/0x18 get_supported_features.isra.0+0x4a0/0x4d0 [cxl_core]
devm_cxl_setup_features+0x84/0x120 [cxl_core]
cxl_pci_probe+0x254/0x5e0 [cxl_pci]
Same class of bug, same fix shape as commit 6c9d2e87df40 ("cxl/fwctl: Fix __fortify_panic"), which fixed the analogous issue in cxlctl_get_supported_features() but missed this one.
[ dj: Fixed up title typo per Jonathan. ]
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026
The Linux kernel vulnerability identified within the CXL subsystem involves a critical initialization order error that triggers runtime bounds checking failures via FORTIFY_SOURCE instrumentation. The core technical flaw resides in the get_supported_features function, where the member num_features of an entries structure is assigned only after a memcpy loop has already executed to populate the ent array. Because the ent array is annotated with __counted_by(num_features), it relies on this field for compile-time and runtime bounds verification. When the compiler's instrumentation checks the validity of memory operations against the declared size, it observes that num_features remains at its default zero value during the execution of the memcpy loop. This discrepancy causes FORTIFY_SOURCE to detect a buffer overflow, specifically reporting a 384-byte write into a buffer with an apparent size of zero, leading to a kernel panic and system instability.
This issue represents a classic instance of improper initialization order resulting in out-of-bounds memory access detection by security hardening mechanisms. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-665, which describes the use of improperly initialized variables or resources that lead to unexpected behavior such as buffer overflows. In this context, while the actual data being written may be within the allocated physical bounds if num_features were correctly set beforehand, the static analysis and runtime checks perceive a zero-length array due to the timing error. This triggers a false positive security alert that manifests as a denial of service through kernel panic rather than an exploitable memory corruption in this specific instance, although similar patterns can often be leveraged for more severe attacks if not properly mitigated by such hardening features.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is primarily system stability and availability. The detection mechanism causes the kernel to halt execution via a BUG call when it encounters what appears to be an invalid memory write operation during device initialization or feature enumeration processes in CXL PCI devices. This results in immediate crashes for systems relying on these specific hardware features, disrupting services that depend on persistent memory or accelerator functionalities provided by CXL technology. The vulnerability was discovered through the activation of FORTIFY_SOURCE protections, which are designed to catch such logic errors before they can be exploited for arbitrary code execution, highlighting the effectiveness of modern kernel hardening techniques in exposing subtle programming mistakes.
Mitigation strategies involve applying the upstream Linux kernel patch that corrects the initialization sequence by setting num_features immediately after memory allocation and prior to any write operations into the ent array. This ensures that the bounds information is accurate throughout the entire lifetime of the data structure, allowing FORTIFY_SOURCE to correctly validate subsequent memory accesses. Administrators should update their systems to a patched kernel version where this logic error has been resolved. Additionally, developers working on similar subsystems should adhere to strict initialization protocols, ensuring that metadata fields used for bounds checking are populated before any dependent operations occur, thereby preventing false positives and maintaining system integrity under security-hardened configurations.