CVE-2026-99796 in Linuxinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/20/2026

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/poll: cancel all matching requests in one pass

With IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL, __io_async_cancel() calls io_try_cancel() until nothing is found, and io_poll_cancel() cancels one request per call, starting each lookup at the beginning of the hash. A cancelled request stays hashed until its task work runs, so every lookup walks past the ones already cancelled. Cancelling K of N pending polls visits about K*N/2 requests in one io_uring_enter(), with uring_lock held.

A single CANCEL_FD|ALL on 80000 polls on one eventfd takes 17.06s, 0.02s with this change. With voluntary preemption the soft lockup watchdog fires:

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 26s! [repro:100]
RIP: 0010:io_cancel_req_match+0x19/0xa0 io_poll_cancel+0x73/0x170 io_try_cancel+0x7b/0xf0 __io_async_cancel+0x41/0x110

Walk the hash once and cancel every match, as io_cancel_remove() does for futex and waitid. Cancel by user_data only needs its own bucket. __io_async_cancel() still loops until nothing is found, so a request that io-wq parks in the poll hash meanwhile is still cancelled.

A cancel that matches one request now walks the whole hash twice instead of stopping at the match.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/21/2026

The Linux kernel's io_uring subsystem contains a performance vulnerability within its asynchronous cancellation logic, specifically affecting the handling of multiple pending I/O requests under high load conditions. The core issue resides in the implementation of __io_async_cancel when invoked with the IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL flag. In this scenario, the function relies on io_try_cancel to locate and cancel matching requests. However, because a cancelled request remains hashed until its associated task work executes, subsequent lookups within the same cancellation operation must traverse previously visited entries in the hash table. This results in an inefficient quadratic time complexity relative to the number of pending polls being cancelled. Specifically, cancelling K out of N pending poll operations requires approximately K times N divided by two requests to be walked through during a single io_uring_enter call while holding the uring_lock.

This inefficiency leads to severe operational impacts under specific conditions, particularly when dealing with large numbers of concurrent events such as those generated on an eventfd file descriptor. In practical scenarios involving eight thousand pending polls, the cancellation process can take over seventeen seconds to complete without this fix. Such prolonged execution times while holding critical kernel locks trigger soft lockup watchdogs in environments where voluntary preemption is enabled, effectively causing a denial of service for other processes competing for CPU time on that core. The system logs indicate a hard hang with messages detailing the CPU being stuck for extended periods within io_cancel_req_match and related cancellation functions.

The technical flaw stems from the lack of optimization in how cancelled requests are handled during batch cancellations. By walking past already-cancelled entries repeatedly, the kernel wastes significant computational resources on redundant hash table traversals. This behavior contrasts with more efficient patterns used elsewhere in the kernel, such as io_cancel_remove for futex and waitid operations, which walk the hash once to cancel every match. The vulnerability is categorized under CWE-400, which covers uncontrolled resource consumption, specifically excessive CPU usage leading to system instability or denial of service conditions due to algorithmic inefficiency rather than a traditional memory leak or buffer overflow.

To mitigate this issue and restore normal performance characteristics, the kernel logic has been updated to walk the hash table only once per cancellation operation where possible. This optimization ensures that every matching request is cancelled in a single pass, significantly reducing the number of operations required for batch cancellations. For systems running affected versions of the Linux kernel, applying the latest security patches and updates provided by your distribution vendor is essential. These updates incorporate the optimized cancellation logic that prevents the quadratic traversal behavior. Administrators should also monitor system logs for soft lockup warnings during high-throughput io_uring workloads as an indicator of whether older, unpatched kernels are still in use within their infrastructure.

Responsible

Linux

Reservation

09/25/2026

Disclosure

11/20/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00296

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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