Zephyr Project up to 4.4.1 NXP MCUX LPADC Driver adc_mcux_lpadc.c mcux_lpadc_start_read buffer_size memory corruption

Summaryinfo

A vulnerability marked as very critical has been reported in Zephyr Project Zephyr up to 4.4.1. This affects the function mcux_lpadc_start_read of the file drivers/adc/adc_mcux_lpadc.c of the component NXP MCUX LPADC Driver. Performing a manipulation of the argument buffer_size results in memory corruption. This vulnerability is reported as CVE-2026-18413. The attack requires a local approach. No exploit exists. It is suggested to upgrade the affected component.

Detailsinfo

A vulnerability, which was classified as very critical, was found in Zephyr Project Zephyr up to 4.4.1. This affects the function mcux_lpadc_start_read of the file drivers/adc/adc_mcux_lpadc.c of the component NXP MCUX LPADC Driver. The manipulation of the argument buffer_size with an unknown input leads to a memory corruption vulnerability. CWE is classifying the issue as CWE-119. The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer. This is going to have an impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The summary by CVE is:

The ADC API requires each driver to reject a sampling sequence whose destination buffer is too small: the buffer_size field of struct adc_sequence in include/zephyr/drivers/adc.h documents that "the driver must ensure that samples are not written beyond the limit and it must return an error if the buffer turns out to be not large enough". The NXP MCUX LPADC driver did not honour that contract. mcux_lpadc_start_read() in drivers/adc/adc_mcux_lpadc.c performed no buffer-size check at all before assigning data->buffer = sequence->buffer. Each completed conversion then stores one 16-bit sample per enabled channel per sampling round through an unbounded *data->buffer++: in mcux_lpadc_isr() for interrupt-driven builds, and in mcux_lpadc_dma_callback() for DMA-driven builds on releases that have the DMA path. A sequence selecting two channels with a two-byte buffer, for example, has its second sample written past the end of the buffer. On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE, adc_read() and adc_read_async() are system calls. The handler in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c copies the sequence in from user memory, verifies only that [buffer, buffer + buffer_size) is writable by the calling thread, and rejects a user-supplied options->callback; it deliberately leaves the size arithmetic to the driver. A user-mode thread that has been granted access to an LPADC device object therefore fully controls channels, buffer, buffer_size and options->extra_samplings, and can request far more samples than its buffer can hold: up to channels * 65536 samples into a two-byte buffer, since the sample pointer is only rewound on a repeat sampling, never on the extra samplings of a sequence. The resulting stores are performed by the driver in kernel mode (in the ADC interrupt handler or the DMA completion callback), where the MPU does not restrict the thread's memory domain, so the write walks linearly out of the user partition and into adjacent memory such as other partitions, kernel data or thread stacks. The impact is kernel-memory corruption of attacker-chosen length at an attacker-chosen offset, a plausible privilege-escalation and denial-of-service primitive from an unprivileged user-mode thread. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE are affected only as a caller-side robustness defect, since the application itself supplies the buffer. The fix calls the new shared helper adc_sequence_validate_buffer() in drivers/adc/adc_common.c from mcux_lpadc_start_read(). The helper computes active_channels sizeof(uint16_t) (1 + extra_samplings) and returns -ENOMEM before any sampling is started.

The advisory is shared at github.com. This vulnerability is uniquely identified as CVE-2026-18413 since 07/30/2026. The exploitability is told to be easy. An attack has to be approached locally. Technical details are known, but no exploit is available. The price for an exploit might be around USD $0-$5k at the moment (estimation calculated on 09/28/2026).

Upgrading to version 4.4.2 eliminates this vulnerability.

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Productinfo

Type

• Project Management Software

Vendor

• Zephyr Project

Name

• Zephyr

Version

• 4.4.0
• 4.4.1

CPE 2.3info

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CPE 2.2info

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Entryinfo

Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.

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