CVE-2003-0147 in OpenSSLinfo

Summary

by MITRE

OpenSSL does not use RSA blinding by default, which allows local and remote attackers to obtain the server s private key by determining factors using timing differences on (1) the number of extra reductions during Montgomery reduction, and (2) the use of different integer multiplication algorithms ("Karatsuba" and normal).

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 01/19/2025

This vulnerability in OpenSSL represents a significant cryptographic weakness that exploits timing side channels to compromise RSA private key security. The flaw stems from the absence of RSA blinding mechanisms in the default configuration, creating an avenue for attackers to systematically extract sensitive cryptographic information through careful observation of computational patterns. The vulnerability specifically targets the Montgomery reduction algorithm and integer multiplication implementations within the RSA cryptographic operations, making it particularly dangerous for servers that handle sensitive cryptographic transactions.

The technical implementation of this vulnerability relies on sophisticated timing analysis techniques that can be executed both locally and remotely. Attackers exploit the predictable timing differences that occur during Montgomery reduction operations, where the number of extra reductions varies based on the input values. Additionally, the system's use of different multiplication algorithms including the Karatsuba algorithm creates distinct timing signatures that can be correlated to deduce the private key components. This timing-based approach falls under the category of side-channel attacks that leverage information leakage from computational processes rather than direct cryptographic weaknesses.

The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple information disclosure, as successful exploitation can lead to complete compromise of the cryptographic infrastructure. Servers utilizing OpenSSL without proper blinding mechanisms become vulnerable to sophisticated attackers who can systematically collect timing data over extended periods to reconstruct the private key. This vulnerability particularly affects web servers, email servers, and any system that relies on RSA encryption for secure communications, potentially allowing attackers to impersonate legitimate services, decrypt sensitive communications, and undermine the entire security model built upon RSA cryptography.

Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate implementation of RSA blinding mechanisms within the OpenSSL configuration and system updates to ensure proper cryptographic protections. Organizations should enable blinding by default in their cryptographic libraries and consider additional countermeasures such as constant-time algorithm implementations and hardware security modules that can prevent timing-based side channel attacks. This vulnerability aligns with CWE-310, which categorizes cryptographic weaknesses related to improper implementation of cryptographic functions, and corresponds to ATT&CK technique T1552.001 for unsecured credentials and T1071.004 for application layer protocol traffic. Regular security audits and monitoring for timing variations in cryptographic operations should be implemented as part of comprehensive security posture assessments. The vulnerability underscores the critical importance of implementing proper cryptographic countermeasures against side-channel attacks and demonstrates how seemingly minor implementation details can have catastrophic security implications for cryptographic systems.

Disclosure

03/31/2003

Moderation

accepted

Entry

VDB-16

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.06393

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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