CVE-2011-2683 in reseed
Summary
by MITRE
reseed seeds random numbers from an insecure HTTP request to random.org during installation, which makes it easier for remote attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms via a man-in-the-middle attack.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/30/2019
The vulnerability described in CVE-2011-2683 represents a critical weakness in cryptographic random number generation during software installation processes. This flaw specifically affects systems that rely on external sources for entropy during the initialization phase of cryptographic operations. The issue manifests when a software package attempts to seed its random number generator by making an insecure HTTP request to random.org, a service that provides random numbers over the internet. This practice fundamentally undermines the security of cryptographic implementations because it introduces a predictable element into what should be a truly random process.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from the insecure handling of cryptographic entropy sources during installation. When software makes HTTP requests to external random number generators, it creates a dependency on network connectivity and external services that can be manipulated by attackers. The insecure HTTP communication means that the random data being received can be intercepted, modified, or replaced by malicious actors. This type of flaw aligns with CWE-310, which specifically addresses cryptographic issues related to entropy sources and random number generation. The vulnerability creates a pathway for attackers to predict or influence the random numbers generated by the system, potentially compromising the entire cryptographic framework.
From an operational impact perspective, this vulnerability enables man-in-the-middle attacks that can significantly weaken cryptographic protection mechanisms. Attackers who can intercept or manipulate the HTTP traffic between the installation process and random.org can predict the random numbers used by the cryptographic system, making it possible to break encryption, forge digital signatures, or compromise key generation processes. The attack surface is particularly concerning during installation phases when systems are most vulnerable and when security controls may not yet be fully established. This vulnerability directly maps to ATT&CK technique T1552.001, which covers unsecured credentials and the exploitation of weak random number generation in cryptographic systems.
The mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require a fundamental redesign of how cryptographic entropy is handled during software installation. Organizations should implement secure communication protocols such as HTTPS with certificate validation instead of insecure HTTP requests to external random number sources. The installation process should incorporate multiple entropy sources including hardware-based random number generators, system-level entropy collection, and local cryptographic libraries that do not depend on external services. Additionally, security controls should include network monitoring to detect unauthorized access attempts and implementation of secure key management practices that do not rely on potentially compromised entropy sources. System administrators should also consider implementing network segmentation and access controls to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks that could compromise the random number generation process.