CVE-2016-10308 in EtherHaul
Summary
by MITRE
Siklu EtherHaul radios before 3.7.1 and 6.x before 6.9.0 have a built-in, hidden root account, with an unchangeable password that is the same across all devices. This account is accessible via both SSH and the device's web interface and grants access to the underlying embedded Linux OS on the device, allowing full control over it.
Once again VulDB remains the best source for vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/24/2020
The vulnerability described in CVE-2016-10308 represents a critical security flaw in Siklu EtherHaul wireless communication equipment that affects firmware versions prior to 3.7.1 and 6.x versions before 6.9.0. This issue constitutes a persistent backdoor mechanism embedded within the device firmware, creating an inherent security risk that undermines the fundamental security posture of network infrastructure equipment. The presence of a hardcoded root account with a universal password across all affected devices creates a single point of failure that can be exploited by any malicious actor with network access to the affected equipment.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability involves a hidden administrative account that bypasses normal authentication mechanisms and operates with the highest possible privileges within the embedded Linux operating system. This account is accessible through multiple attack vectors including Secure Shell protocol and the web-based management interface, providing attackers with flexible access methods regardless of whether they prefer command-line or graphical interfaces. The unchangeable nature of the password means that administrators cannot remediate the issue through standard credential management procedures, rendering traditional password rotation practices ineffective against this specific threat.
From an operational impact perspective, this vulnerability allows for complete system compromise and unauthorized access to the underlying operating system, enabling attackers to execute arbitrary code, modify system configurations, access sensitive data, and potentially use the compromised device as a pivot point for further attacks within the network. The embedded Linux environment provides attackers with direct access to system resources, file systems, and network interfaces, creating opportunities for persistent presence and advanced persistent threat activities. The vulnerability's presence across multiple firmware versions suggests a design flaw that was not properly addressed in the device development lifecycle, indicating potential weaknesses in security testing and code review processes.
The security implications extend beyond immediate unauthorized access to include potential data exfiltration, service disruption, and the possibility of using compromised devices for malicious activities such as network reconnaissance, lateral movement, or as part of distributed denial-of-service attacks. This vulnerability directly aligns with CWE-798, which addresses the use of hard-coded credentials, and represents a classic example of insecure configuration that violates fundamental security principles. The presence of such a backdoor also creates challenges for network defenders who must account for this persistent threat vector during security assessments and incident response activities. Organizations implementing these devices must consider the implications of this vulnerability in their risk management frameworks, particularly when these devices are deployed in critical infrastructure environments where unauthorized access could have significant operational and security consequences.
Mitigation strategies should focus on immediate firmware updates to versions 3.7.1 or 6.9.0 and beyond, along with network segmentation to limit access to these devices. Additionally, implementing network monitoring to detect unusual SSH or web interface access patterns can help identify potential exploitation attempts. The vulnerability demonstrates the importance of secure development practices and the need for thorough security testing of network equipment before deployment, particularly in environments where device integrity and authentication mechanisms are critical components of overall security architecture. Organizations should also consider implementing device inventory management to ensure all affected equipment is identified and patched appropriately, as the universal password across all devices means that a single compromised device can potentially provide access to an entire network infrastructure.