CVE-2026-106763 in sagemathmcpserver
Summary
by MITRE • 10/23/2026
An issue in @justice8096/sagemath-mcp-server 1.0.1 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the escapeShellString and sanitizeCode functions.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/23/2026
The vulnerability identified in version 1.0.1 of the sagemath-mcp-server package, attributed to developer @justice8096, represents a critical server-side security flaw rooted in improper input validation and sanitization mechanisms. This issue specifically affects two core functions within the application logic: escapeShellString and sanitizeCode. These components are responsible for processing user-supplied data before it is passed to underlying system commands or interpreted by the SageMath computational engine. The fundamental technical flaw lies in the failure of these functions to adequately neutralize special characters, metacharacters, or command separators that could alter the intended structure of a shell command or code execution context. By relying on insufficient escaping logic, the application fails to distinguish between legitimate data input and malicious payload injection, thereby creating an avenue for attackers to manipulate how commands are constructed and executed by the operating system or interpreter environment.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability is classified under CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, commonly known as Operating System Command Injection. The escapeShellString function likely attempts to sanitize input for shell execution but lacks comprehensive coverage against all possible injection vectors, such as backticks, semicolons, pipe characters, or logical operators like AND and OR sequences. Similarly, the sanitizeCode function appears to have gaps in its filtering logic that allow malicious code snippets to bypass security checks and be executed within the SageMath environment. This deficiency enables a remote attacker who can interact with the server's API endpoints to inject arbitrary commands that are then processed by the backend system. The attack does not require authentication if the affected endpoints are publicly accessible, or it requires minimal privileges if they are restricted, depending on the specific deployment configuration of the MCP server.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and potentially catastrophic for systems relying on this service. Successful exploitation allows a remote attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) with the privileges granted to the process running the sagemath-mcp-server application. This could range from reading sensitive files, exfiltrating data, pivoting to other internal network resources, or completely compromising the host server by installing malware, creating backdoors, or launching denial-of-service attacks against critical infrastructure. In environments where SageMath is used for scientific computing or educational purposes, this breach undermines the integrity of computational results and exposes confidential research data or student information stored on the same system. The ability to execute arbitrary code effectively grants full control over the underlying operating system layer associated with the application process.
This vulnerability aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, specifically sub-techniques related to shell commands such as sh or bash (T1059.004). Attackers can leverage this flaw to execute complex command chains that automate further exploitation steps without needing direct access to the server's console. The lack of robust input sanitization also reflects weaknesses in CWE-20 Improper Input Validation, indicating a broader architectural issue where trust boundaries are not properly enforced at the entry points for user data.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate action is required by upgrading to a patched version of sagemath-mcp-server if one has been released by the maintainer. In the interim, organizations should implement strict input validation and sanitization strategies that adhere to allow-listing principles rather than relying solely on block-lists or simple escape functions. It is crucial to avoid passing user-supplied data directly to shell commands; instead, applications should use native APIs for file operations and process management where possible. If command execution is unavoidable, arguments must be passed as distinct array elements to the system call function rather than concatenated into a single string, which prevents shell interpretation of injected metacharacters. Additionally, deploying Web Application Firewalls with rules specifically tuned to detect common injection patterns can provide an additional layer of defense while patching efforts are underway. Regular security audits and static code analysis tools configured to flag command injection risks should be integrated into the development lifecycle to prevent similar issues in future releases.