CVE-2026-110278 in ContextForge MCP Gateway
Summary
by MITRE • 11/14/2026
IBM ContextForge MCP Gateway 1.0.0 through 1.1.0 could allow an attacker to replay identity propagation claims signatures or expose sensitive user identity information to third-party MCP servers due to static signature payloads and missing per-gateway configuration checks during tool invocation.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/14/2026
The vulnerability in IBM ContextForge MCP Gateway versions 1.0.0 through 1.1.0 represents a critical failure in the implementation of secure identity propagation mechanisms within multi-cloud platform architectures. This flaw stems from two distinct but related technical deficiencies: the use of static signature payloads for identity claims and the absence of rigorous per-gateway configuration validation during tool invocation processes. In modern distributed systems, particularly those involving Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of user identities is paramount to preventing unauthorized access and data leakage. The specific design choices made in these versions compromise both authentication assurance and authorization boundaries, creating a pathway for attackers to manipulate identity assertions or exfiltrate sensitive personal information.
At the core of this vulnerability is the use of static signature payloads when generating signatures for identity propagation claims. In secure cryptographic implementations, signatures must be dynamically generated based on unique session data, timestamps, nonces, or other mutable context variables to ensure that each assertion is unique and tied to a specific interaction instance. By employing static signatures, the system fails to bind the identity claim to the current execution context effectively. This lack of dynamic binding allows an attacker to capture a valid signature from one legitimate request and reuse it in another request at a later time or against a different target service. This mechanism is characteristic of replay attacks, where previously valid authentication data is exploited to bypass security controls without needing to crack cryptographic keys or compromise user credentials directly.
The second component of this vulnerability involves the missing per-gateway configuration checks during tool invocation. In complex gateway architectures, each instance or endpoint may have distinct access policies, allowed scopes, and trusted identity providers. The failure to validate these specific configurations before allowing a tool to execute means that the system does not enforce strict boundaries between different operational contexts. An attacker can exploit this lack of validation by invoking tools in ways that were not intended for their assigned role or context. This oversight allows for potential privilege escalation or unauthorized data access, as the gateway processes requests without verifying whether the specific invocation aligns with the configured security policies for that particular gateway instance.
The operational impact of these flaws is severe, affecting both confidentiality and integrity within the affected environment. The ability to replay identity propagation claims signatures enables attackers to impersonate legitimate users across different sessions or services, effectively bypassing multi-factor authentication or session-based access controls if they are reliant on such static assertions. Furthermore, the exposure of sensitive user identity information to third-party MCP servers poses a significant privacy risk. If an attacker can manipulate tool invocations due to missing configuration checks, they may trigger processes that leak personally identifiable information (PII) or other confidential data to external entities that should not have access to it under normal operational parameters. This compromises the trust model of the entire platform and violates principles of least privilege and data minimization.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-294, which describes authentication bypass by capture-replay, due to the static signature issue allowing replay attacks. Additionally, the failure to enforce per-gateway configuration checks relates closely to CWE-862, missing authorization, as well as CWE-732, incorrect permission assignment, because the system fails to restrict actions based on proper contextual configurations. In terms of adversary tactics, this vulnerability facilitates techniques associated with MITRE ATT&CK ID T1550, specifically sub-technique T1550.004 for use of authentication tokens in credential stuffing or replay attacks. It also touches upon T1078, valid accounts, as the attacker leverages legitimate but misused identity claims to gain unauthorized access.
To mitigate these risks, immediate remediation is required by upgrading IBM ContextForge MCP Gateway to a version beyond 1.1.0 where these issues have been addressed. The fix must ensure that all signature payloads for identity propagation are dynamically generated using unique context data such as nonces and timestamps to prevent replay attacks. Furthermore, the gateway implementation must be updated to include strict validation of per-gateway configurations during every tool invocation step. This involves verifying that the requested action aligns with the specific security policies assigned to the target gateway instance before execution proceeds. Organizations should also implement network-level monitoring to detect unusual patterns of identity claim usage or unexpected tool invocations, providing an additional layer of defense while patching is applied. Regular audits of authentication flows and configuration management practices are recommended to ensure ongoing compliance with secure development standards.