CVE-2026-110390 in FlexNet Beacon
Summary
by MITRE • 11/06/2026
Missing authentication in the FlexNet Beacon component of Flexera One and FlexNet Manager Suite allows unauthenticated remote attackers to obtain Beacon policy and targeting information when anonymous web server access is enabled (the default).
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/06/2026
The identified vulnerability resides within the FlexNet Beacon component, a critical agent used by Flexera One and FlexNet Manager Suite for data collection and communication with central management servers. This security flaw stems from an insufficient authentication mechanism that fails to enforce identity verification on specific endpoints exposed via the web server interface of the beacon service. Under default configuration settings, anonymous access is enabled, which means that any remote actor capable of reaching the network segment hosting the FlexNet Beacon can interact with these interfaces without providing valid credentials or security tokens. This architectural oversight effectively turns a management tool into an open information source for unauthorized parties who have network-level connectivity to the affected systems.
The technical nature of this flaw is classified as a failure in access control, specifically falling under CWE-287: Improper Authentication and CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function. The vulnerability allows unauthenticated remote attackers to query the beacon service directly through HTTP requests. Because the web server component does not validate the identity of the requester before serving sensitive configuration data, it exposes internal operational details that are intended only for authorized management infrastructure. This lack of enforcement represents a fundamental breakdown in the principle of least privilege and secure default configurations, where systems should require explicit authorization by default rather than requiring administrators to manually disable anonymous access.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant due to the sensitivity of the data exposed. Attackers can retrieve Beacon policy definitions and targeting information, which include details about how the beacon is configured to collect software usage data, inventory metrics, and license compliance reports. This intelligence allows adversaries to map out an organization's IT infrastructure with high precision. By understanding what assets are being monitored and how they are grouped for management purposes, attackers can identify critical systems, locate potential lateral movement paths, and tailor subsequent attacks to evade detection mechanisms that rely on these specific monitoring policies. The exposure of targeting information essentially provides a roadmap for further exploitation within the enterprise environment.
This vulnerability aligns with several tactics in the MITRE ATT&CK framework, particularly Reconnaissance techniques such as T1592: Gather Victim Host Information and T1608: Stage Capabilities. By obtaining beacon policies, an attacker gains insight into the defensive posture of the target organization, including which endpoints are actively monitored for anomalies or unauthorized software installations. This knowledge enables more stealthy malicious activities by allowing attackers to avoid triggering specific alerts associated with the targeted monitoring rules. Furthermore, if this information is combined with other intelligence gathering efforts, it facilitates precise targeting during later stages of an attack lifecycle, such as Initial Access or Persistence, where understanding the security controls in place is crucial for success.
Mitigation strategies must focus on immediate remediation through configuration hardening and long-term architectural improvements. The most direct solution is to disable anonymous web server access within the FlexNet Beacon settings immediately upon detection. Administrators should enforce strict authentication requirements so that only authorized management servers or trusted administrative accounts can query beacon policies and targeting data. Additionally, network segmentation plays a vital role in limiting exposure; the beacon service should be restricted to communicate only with designated internal management IPs via firewalls or access control lists, preventing external or unauthorized lateral movement from reaching these endpoints. Regular security audits of default configurations are also recommended to ensure that sensitive services do not remain exposed due to out-of-the-box settings designed for ease of deployment rather than production-grade security.