CVE-2026-111495 in MatchPoint
Summary
by MITRE • 11/05/2026
API keys, credentials, and configuration parameters embedded in the MatchPoint APK, which can be extracted through reverse engineering. The vendor distinguishes the extracted elements from Google Maps and Firebase keys that must remain on the client side and considers them project identifiers, not authentication secrets. The impact depends on the capabilities and restrictions of each exposed element.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/05/2026
The vulnerability identified in the MatchPoint Android application involves the insecure storage and exposure of sensitive configuration parameters, API keys, and credentials within the compiled APK file. This issue stems from a fundamental flaw in the mobile application development lifecycle where developers have embedded secrets directly into the client-side binary without employing adequate obfuscation or secure extraction mechanisms. While the vendor argues that certain elements such as Google Maps and Firebase identifiers are intended to remain on the client side for functional purposes, they classify these exposed items strictly as project identifiers rather than authentication secrets. This distinction is technically flawed because many of these keys possess permissions that allow interaction with backend services, effectively granting unauthorized access or enabling resource consumption if misused by malicious actors who can reverse engineer the application binary.
Reverse engineering tools commonly available in the cybersecurity community make it trivial for attackers to decompile Android applications and extract embedded strings, configuration files, and library references. Once extracted, these credentials may allow an attacker to impersonate the legitimate client application when communicating with backend APIs or third-party services. The operational impact of this vulnerability is contingent upon the specific permissions associated with each exposed key. For instance, if a Google Maps API key lacks proper domain or package name restrictions, it can be used by unauthorized parties to generate map tiles and consume quota limits, potentially leading to significant financial costs for the organization through billing abuse. Similarly, Firebase keys that are not properly scoped may allow attackers to read from or write to cloud databases, compromising user data integrity and confidentiality.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, as it involves the inclusion of sensitive authentication information directly within source code or compiled binaries rather than retrieving them securely at runtime from a protected environment such as Android Keystore or a secure backend service. Furthermore, this flaw facilitates subsequent attacks categorized under MITRE ATT&CK Mobile Attack Pattern T1537: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, where attackers strip away protections to reveal hidden data. The lack of dynamic secret management means that even if the application is updated, any previously distributed versions remain vulnerable until they are no longer in use by a significant number of devices, creating a prolonged window of exposure.
Mitigation strategies must focus on removing hard-coded secrets from the client-side code entirely. Developers should migrate sensitive configuration parameters to a secure backend server and implement an authentication flow where the mobile application requests temporary tokens or session keys after verifying user credentials against a protected identity provider. For public-facing identifiers like API keys that are required for functionality, strict restrictions must be applied at the service level. This includes binding Google Maps and Firebase keys to specific Android package names and SHA-1 certificate fingerprints to prevent their use in unauthorized applications. Additionally, implementing code obfuscation tools such as ProGuard or R8 can raise the barrier for casual reverse engineering, although this should not be relied upon as a primary security control since determined attackers can still bypass these measures. Regular automated scanning of APK files during the CI/CD pipeline is also recommended to detect and prevent the accidental inclusion of sensitive strings before deployment.