CVE-2026-111490 in MatchPoint
Summary
by MITRE • 11/05/2026
Insecure direct object reference (IDOR) vulnerability in the MatchPoint API, which relies on the `actingasuser` HTTP header without verifying the requester's authorization for the specified user. Manipulation of sequential identifiers allows access to personal, banking, and financial data, private messages, and QR codes for physical access, as well as the ability to modify third-party accounts, change passwords, impersonate users, and transfer virtual balances.
Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/05/2026
The identified vulnerability represents a critical failure in server-side authorization controls within the MatchPoint API infrastructure, specifically manifesting as an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). This flaw stems from the application's reliance on the `actingasuser` HTTP header to determine which user context should be used for processing subsequent requests. The core technical deficiency lies in the absence of a robust verification mechanism that validates whether the authenticated session initiating the request possesses administrative privileges or explicit permission to act on behalf of the target user identified by this header. In secure architectural designs, such impersonation capabilities must be strictly gated behind multi-factor authentication and rigorous role-based access control checks. Instead, the system blindly trusts the client-supplied identifier, allowing any authenticated actor to arbitrarily select a victim's identity without proving their own authority to do so.
The exploitation of this vulnerability is facilitated by the manipulation of sequential identifiers or predictable user IDs embedded within the `actingasuser` parameter. By incrementing or decrementing these numeric values in successive API calls, an attacker can systematically enumerate valid user accounts and access data belonging to individuals other than themselves. This brute-force approach is highly efficient because it does not require complex cryptographic attacks or session hijacking; it merely requires iterating through a predictable range of identifiers until the desired target account is reached. The lack of rate limiting on this specific endpoint further exacerbates the risk, allowing for rapid and undetected enumeration attempts that can compromise hundreds or thousands of user profiles in a short timeframe.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the breadth of sensitive data accessible through the compromised API endpoints. Attackers gain unauthorized access to personally identifiable information including names, addresses, and contact details, as well as highly sensitive financial records such as banking coordinates and transaction histories. Beyond static data exposure, the flaw enables active account takeover scenarios where adversaries can modify third-party accounts, reset passwords to seize control of user sessions, and impersonate legitimate users in real-time interactions. This capability extends to social engineering vectors through access to private messages, which could be used for further phishing campaigns or blackmail. Furthermore, the ability to retrieve QR codes intended for physical access grants attackers potential entry into secure facilities if those digital tokens are linked to building security systems.
The financial implications of this vulnerability extend beyond data theft to direct monetary loss via the manipulation of virtual balances and asset transfers. Since the attacker can impersonate users with varying levels of trust or account status, they may exploit discrepancies in balance validation logic to transfer funds from victim accounts to controlled wallets. This not only results in immediate financial harm but also erodes user confidence in the platform's security posture. The combination of data exfiltration and active manipulation creates a dual-threat scenario where both confidentiality and integrity are compromised, potentially leading to regulatory penalties under frameworks such as GDPR or CCPA due to the exposure of protected personal information without consent.
To mitigate this critical risk, immediate remediation efforts must focus on implementing strict server-side authorization checks for any endpoint utilizing impersonation headers. The `actingasuser` parameter should only be accepted if the requesting user holds a specific administrative role with explicit permission to manage other accounts, and even then, it should require additional verification steps such as multi-factor authentication confirmation from an admin account. Developers must also replace sequential identifiers with non-predictable unique identifiers like UUIDs to mitigate enumeration risks, although this is secondary to fixing the authorization logic itself. Input validation should ensure that user IDs are strictly typed and exist within a verified database record before any processing occurs.
Long-term security improvements should involve adopting industry-standard frameworks for access control verification as defined by CWE-639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key). Implementing an allow-list approach where only explicitly permitted actions can be performed on behalf of other users will significantly reduce the attack surface. Additionally, integrating comprehensive logging and monitoring solutions aligned with MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as T1078 (Valid Accounts) and T1534 (Internal Spearphishing) can help detect anomalous patterns indicative of IDOR exploitation in real-time. Regular penetration testing focused on API security and automated static analysis tools configured to flag missing authorization checks are essential for maintaining a resilient defense posture against such identity-based attacks.