CVE-2026-111692 in DataBuff
Summary
by MITRE • 10/16/2026
DataBuff ai-apm-web through 0.1.10 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to forge admin session tokens by using the hardcoded HMAC secret in JwtTokenService. Attackers can sign a payload of admin and a future expiry with the default dev-secret to gain full administrative access to protected /webapi routes, including the Doris SQL query API.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/17/2026
The vulnerability identified within DataBuff ai-apm-web versions up to 0.1.10 represents a critical authentication bypass flaw rooted in insecure cryptographic key management practices. Specifically, the JwtTokenService component utilizes a hardcoded HMAC secret, referred to as dev-secret, for signing JSON Web Tokens. This design choice fundamentally undermines the integrity and authenticity guarantees that JWTs are intended to provide. By embedding a static, predictable secret directly into the application code or configuration rather than deriving it from a secure environment variable or key management system, the security model collapses because any actor with access to the source code, binary artifacts, or network traffic can easily extract this credential. This failure aligns closely with CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials and CWE-321: Use of a Key for the Wrong Purpose if the secret was intended for development but leaked into production contexts without rotation mechanisms.
The operational impact of this flaw is severe, as it allows unauthenticated attackers to forge valid administrative session tokens at will. By leveraging knowledge of the hardcoded dev-secret, an attacker can construct JWT payloads that claim admin privileges and set expiration times far in the future. Once these forged tokens are presented to the application, they are accepted as legitimate by the authentication middleware due to the successful HMAC signature verification using the known secret. This effectively grants the attacker full administrative access to all protected web API routes without needing valid user credentials or multi-factor authentication bypasses beyond this single cryptographic weakness. The ability to generate arbitrary admin tokens means that traditional session hijacking defenses are rendered useless, as the application cannot distinguish between a legitimately issued token and one forged by an external adversary.
The scope of compromise extends significantly due to the inclusion of sensitive administrative interfaces in the attack surface. Most notably, access is gained to the Doris SQL query API, which serves as a powerful interface for interacting with underlying data warehouses or analytics engines. An attacker leveraging this unauthorized admin access can execute arbitrary SQL queries against the backend database infrastructure. This capability transforms an authentication bypass into potential full system compromise, enabling actions such as data exfiltration of sensitive business intelligence records, modification or deletion of critical datasets, and potentially using the compromised server as a pivot point for further network intrusion. The exposure of administrative APIs to unauthenticated actors via forged tokens constitutes a direct violation of security principles regarding access control and privilege separation.
From an offensive security perspective, this vulnerability maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078: Valid Accounts, specifically the sub-technique related to Default Accounts or Hardcoded Credentials where attackers leverage known default credentials to gain initial access. Furthermore, because the attacker is forging tokens rather than stealing existing ones, it also touches upon aspects of token manipulation and abuse found in various authentication bypass methodologies documented in industry frameworks. The lack of proper key rotation policies means that even if the secret were discovered later, previous forged tokens would remain valid until their artificially extended expiration dates pass, prolonging the window of exposure.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate remediation through code changes and infrastructure hardening. The primary fix involves removing the hardcoded dev-secret from the JwtTokenService implementation entirely. Instead, the application should utilize a strong, randomly generated secret key that is injected via secure environment variables or integrated with a dedicated secrets management solution such as HashiCorp Vault or AWS Secrets Manager. This ensures that keys are not embedded in source control repositories and can be rotated independently of code deployments. Additionally, implementing strict input validation on JWT claims and verifying token issuance timestamps against server time can help mitigate the impact of forged future-expiry tokens, although removing the hardcoded secret is the only definitive solution. Security teams should also audit all API endpoints for proper authorization checks independent of authentication mechanisms to ensure defense-in-depth principles are applied. Regular automated scanning for hard-coded secrets in codebases and configuration files using tools like GitLeaks or TruffleHog can prevent similar issues from being introduced into future releases, ensuring that development practices align with secure coding standards such as those outlined by OWASP regarding session management and cryptographic storage.