CVE-2026-111691 in WIMOOR
Summary
by MITRE • 10/16/2026
WIMOOR through commit ec86736 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows attackers to impersonate any tenant and privilege level by sending an unsigned X-USERINFO header. Attackers reaching backend service ports directly, bypassing the gateway, can forge companyid and manager or admin usertype values to read and modify other tenants' orders, finance data, and Amazon seller authorizations.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/16/2026
The vulnerability identified in WIMOOR represents a critical authentication bypass flaw rooted in improper validation of user identity headers within the application's backend architecture. This issue stems from commit ec86736, where the system fails to adequately verify the integrity or origin of the X-USERINFO header sent by clients. In secure web applications, such headers are often used for internal service-to-service communication or as part of a broader authentication flow managed by an API gateway. However, in this instance, the backend services accept these headers without sufficient cryptographic verification or source validation, allowing any entity that can reach the backend directly to inject arbitrary identity information. This design flaw effectively decouples user identification from actual authenticated sessions, creating a severe trust boundary violation where the system blindly trusts client-supplied metadata regarding tenant affiliation and administrative privileges.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is profound, as it enables attackers to impersonate any tenant and assume any privilege level within the application ecosystem. By sending an unsigned X-USERINFO header containing forged company identifiers and user type values such as manager or admin, malicious actors can bypass standard access controls entirely. This capability allows for unauthorized reading and modification of sensitive data belonging to other tenants, including order histories, financial records, and Amazon seller authorizations. The ability to manipulate finance data poses significant risks related to fraud and regulatory compliance, while the compromise of seller authorizations could lead to further supply chain disruptions or intellectual property theft. Since this bypass occurs at the backend service level, it suggests that traditional perimeter defenses like firewalls may not be sufficient if attackers can establish direct network connectivity to these internal services, highlighting a potential misconfiguration in network segmentation or ingress point security.
From a technical classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-287 Improper Authentication and CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity. The failure to verify the source and integrity of the X-USERINFO header indicates that the application does not adequately ensure that the identity claims presented by the client are genuine and untampered. Furthermore, this attack vector is consistent with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts, specifically involving legitimate credentials or tokens being forged to gain access. The scenario also reflects aspects of T1534 Internal Spearphishing if the initial compromise involved social engineering, but more directly it represents a direct exploitation of trust relationships between components, akin to T1621 Trust Relationship Manipulation in cloud environments where services are expected to validate each other's identities securely.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate remediation efforts should focus on enforcing strict validation mechanisms for all identity-related headers. The backend services must implement cryptographic signing or token-based verification such as JSON Web Tokens (JWT) with strong signature algorithms like RS256 to ensure that the X-USERINFO header has not been tampered with and originates from a trusted source, typically an API gateway or authentication service rather than direct client input. Additionally, network-level controls should be reviewed to prevent unauthorized direct access to backend service ports; these services should only accept traffic from designated internal proxies or gateways using IP whitelisting or mutual TLS (mTLS) for service-to-service communication. Implementing comprehensive logging and monitoring of header values can also aid in detecting attempted exploitation attempts, allowing security teams to respond rapidly to any anomalies indicative of this bypass technique being actively exploited against the system.