CVE-2026-111660 in waynboot-mall
Summary
by MITRE • 10/16/2026
waynboot-mall through 2.0.0 contains a missing authentication vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to cancel any member's pending order via the /callback/order/unpaid endpoint. Attackers can submit predictable orderSn values, built from epoch seconds and a sequential counter, to auto-cancel unpaid orders and manipulate product stock levels.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/16/2026
The identified vulnerability in waynboot-mall versions up to 2.0.0 represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms, specifically classified under CWE-306 as Missing Authentication for Critical Function. This flaw resides within the /callback/order/unpaid endpoint, which is designed to handle asynchronous notifications regarding payment status changes. In a secure architecture, such endpoints must strictly verify that the requesting entity possesses valid authentication credentials and sufficient authorization rights relative to the specific order being modified. However, in this implementation, the system fails to enforce any form of identity verification or session validation before processing requests intended to cancel pending orders. This absence of security checks allows unauthenticated actors to interact directly with backend business logic without establishing a trusted context, effectively bypassing the application's primary gatekeeping measures and exposing sensitive operational functions to public access.
The technical exploitation of this vulnerability relies heavily on the predictability of order identifiers generated by the system. The application constructs orderSn values using a combination of epoch seconds and a sequential counter, creating an algorithmic pattern that is easily reversible or guessable by external parties. An attacker can automate the generation of these predictable order numbers to systematically target unpaid orders belonging to legitimate users. By submitting requests with these crafted identifiers to the vulnerable endpoint, the attacker triggers the cancellation logic without needing valid user sessions or API keys. This methodical approach allows for high-volume attacks where multiple orders across different accounts can be manipulated simultaneously, leveraging the deterministic nature of the identifier generation process to achieve widespread disruption rather than targeting a single isolated incident.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple order manipulation and directly affects inventory integrity and business continuity. When an attacker successfully cancels pending unpaid orders through automated scripts, it results in artificial fluctuations in product stock levels. This can lead to overselling scenarios where items appear available due to canceled reservations but are actually reserved by other users who have not yet completed payment, causing fulfillment failures and customer dissatisfaction. Furthermore, the ability to cancel any member's order constitutes a denial of service against legitimate commerce operations, potentially disrupting revenue streams and damaging brand reputation. The lack of authentication also implies that attackers can perform these actions without leaving traceable user-specific logs in some logging implementations, complicating forensic analysis and incident response efforts as it becomes difficult to attribute malicious activity to specific individuals based solely on application logs.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate remediation must focus on enforcing strict access control policies for all administrative or state-changing endpoints. The /callback/order/unpaid endpoint should require valid authentication tokens, such as JWTs or session cookies, and verify that the authenticated user has explicit permission to modify the specific order referenced in the request payload. Implementing server-side validation of order ownership is essential; the system must confirm that the requester owns the order before allowing cancellation. Additionally, replacing predictable sequential identifiers with cryptographically secure random UUIDs would significantly increase the difficulty for attackers to guess valid order numbers, adding a layer of defense through obscurity even if access controls are later found to be insufficient. It is also recommended to implement rate limiting and anomaly detection on this endpoint to identify and block automated scanning or bulk cancellation attempts that deviate from normal user behavior patterns. These measures align with industry standards such as OWASP API Security Top 10, particularly regarding broken object level authorization and lack of resources & rate limiting controls.