CVE-2026-112011 in libtta
Summary
by MITRE • 10/18/2026
libtta through 2.3 contains an integer overflow vulnerability in tta_decoder_init_get_info() that allows attackers to cause a heap buffer overflow on 32-bit builds via unvalidated header fields. Attackers can supply a crafted .tta file with a sample rate of 1 and large samples value, wrapping the seek table allocation and crashing applications.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/18/2026
The vulnerability identified in libtta versions up to 2.3 represents a critical memory safety issue rooted in improper integer arithmetic during the initialization phase of audio decoding operations. Specifically, the flaw resides within the tta_decoder_init_get_info function, which is responsible for parsing metadata and allocating necessary data structures based on header fields found in .tta files. When processing these headers, the library fails to validate whether the resulting calculations will exceed the limits of a 32-bit integer before performing memory allocation. This lack of validation allows an attacker to supply a maliciously crafted input file where specific parameters are manipulated to trigger arithmetic overflow conditions.
The technical mechanism involves manipulating two key header fields: sample rate and samples count. By setting the sample rate to one and providing a large value for the number of samples, an attacker can cause the calculation used to determine the size of the seek table allocation to wrap around due to 32-bit integer limitations. Instead of allocating memory proportional to the actual required size, which would be substantial given the large samples count, the overflow causes the calculated size to become a small positive integer or zero. Consequently, the system allocates an insufficiently sized buffer on the heap that is far too small to hold the intended data structures derived from the file's content.
This discrepancy between the allocated buffer size and the actual amount of data written during subsequent decoding operations leads directly to a heap buffer overflow. As the decoder proceeds to process the audio stream, it writes beyond the bounds of the under-allocated memory region. This out-of-bounds write corrupts adjacent memory structures on the heap, which can lead to application crashes in benign scenarios but poses severe security risks when exploited with precise control over the overwritten data. The ability to overwrite heap metadata or function pointers enables potential remote code execution vulnerabilities if an attacker can carefully craft the payload following the overflow.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-190, which denotes integer overflow or wraparound, and CWE-787, which refers to out-of-bounds write on heap memory. These classifications highlight the fundamental failure in input validation and bounds checking that characterizes many legacy media processing libraries. The attack vector is classified under ATT&CK technique T1203, specifically targeting exploitation for code execution through client-side attacks involving malicious files delivered via social engineering or compromised websites hosting infected audio content.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple denial of service through application crashes. While crashing the media player or decoder is a guaranteed outcome upon processing the crafted file, the underlying heap corruption creates opportunities more severe than availability loss. If an attacker can control the data written into the overflowed region, they may achieve arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running the vulnerable application. This risk is particularly acute in environments where users frequently open audio files from untrusted sources or when automated systems process large volumes of media content without sandboxing protections.
Mitigation strategies must focus on both immediate patching and long-term defensive coding practices. The primary remediation involves updating libtta to a version greater than 2.3, where the developers have presumably implemented proper bounds checking and integer overflow detection within the tta_decoder_init_get_info function. For systems unable to update immediately, input validation at the application layer can serve as a temporary defense by rejecting files with extreme header values that deviate from expected norms for valid audio formats. Additionally, employing compiler-based security features such as stack protectors or heap hardening mechanisms like ASAN (Address Sanitizer) during development and testing phases helps detect these issues early before deployment.
Developers should also consider adopting static analysis tools capable of identifying integer overflow patterns in C/C++ codebases to prevent similar vulnerabilities from being introduced in future updates. Enforcing strict validation of all external inputs, particularly those influencing memory allocation sizes, is essential for maintaining the integrity of media processing software. Regular security audits and fuzz testing against known vulnerable formats like .tta files can further strengthen resilience against such exploitation attempts by identifying edge cases that standard code review might miss.