CVE-2026-112014 in LobsterAI
Summary
by MITRE • 10/18/2026
LobsterAI before 2026.10.16 contains a hardcoded password vulnerability that allows attackers to decrypt exported provider API keys encrypted with the constant 'lobsterai-APP'. Attackers who obtain a providers export file can derive the AES-GCM key via PBKDF2 using the embedded salt and recover every third-party AI provider API key.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/18/2026
The vulnerability identified in LobsterAI prior to version 2026.10.16 represents a critical failure in cryptographic implementation, specifically categorized under CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials. This flaw stems from the use of a static, hardcoded string 'lobsterai-APP' as part of the key derivation process for encrypting exported provider API keys. In secure software design, secrets such as encryption keys or passwords must be unique per instance and generated using high-entropy random sources to prevent prediction by adversaries. By embedding this constant directly into the application binary or source code, LobsterAI has effectively removed any element of secrecy from its cryptographic scheme, rendering the protection mechanism illusory for anyone with access to the compiled software or exported data files.
The technical mechanics of this vulnerability involve the use of AES-GCM encryption secured by a key derived via PBKDF2. While PBKDF2 is an appropriate algorithm for deriving keys from passwords when combined with unique salts and sufficient iteration counts, its security relies entirely on the secrecy and randomness of the input password or secret material. In this case, although each exported provider file contains an embedded salt intended to prevent rainbow table attacks, the core secret used in conjunction with that salt is fixed across all installations. Consequently, any attacker who obtains a providers export file can immediately apply PBKDF2 using the known hardcoded string 'lobsterai-APP' and the extracted salt to reconstruct the exact AES-GCM key. This process requires no brute-force effort or side-channel analysis, as the derivation parameters are fully deterministic and publicly available within the application's logic.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, leading directly to CWE-209: Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information in terms of data exposure, though more accurately classified under CWE-315: Use of Hard-coded Password for Authentication or Encryption. Once an attacker derives the decryption key, they can decrypt every third-party AI provider API key stored within the exported file. These keys typically grant access to powerful artificial intelligence services that may involve significant financial costs, proprietary data processing capabilities, and integration with other enterprise systems. Compromise of these credentials allows attackers to impersonate legitimate users, incur unauthorized charges against victim accounts, exfiltrate sensitive data processed through those AI models, or inject malicious prompts into automated workflows. This aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1539: Steal Web Session Cookie, extended here to API keys, which are functionally equivalent in many modern application architectures for authenticating service-to-service communication.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The primary fix is the release of version 2026.10.16 or later, where this hardcoded credential has been replaced with a dynamic key generation mechanism. For organizations still running affected versions, it is imperative to rotate all exposed API keys immediately upon discovery, as they should be considered fully compromised regardless of whether an actual breach occurred. Furthermore, future development cycles must adhere to OWASP Cryptographic Cheat Sheet guidelines, ensuring that encryption keys are generated using cryptographically secure random number generators and stored in dedicated secret management solutions rather than within application code or easily accessible export files. Implementing hardware security modules or cloud-based key vaults can further isolate sensitive material from the general application runtime environment, reducing the attack surface for similar vulnerabilities.