CVE-2026-115722 in RPly
Summary
by MITRE • 10/23/2026
RPly through 1.1.4 contains an improper array index validation vulnerability in ply_read_header_property() that accepts list as a list property's length or value type. Attackers can supply a crafted PLY file that makes ply_read_list_property() call an out-of-bounds handler, crashing ASCII parsing or corrupting memory in binary parsing.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/23/2026
The vulnerability identified within the RPly library prior to version 1.1.4 represents a critical flaw in input validation logic, specifically located within the ply_read_header_property function. This component is responsible for processing metadata and structural definitions found at the beginning of PLY (Polygon File Format) files, which are commonly used in computer graphics applications to store polygon mesh data. The core technical deficiency lies in the improper handling of array indices when parsing list properties. Specifically, the library fails to adequately validate whether a value designated as either the length or the type identifier for a list property falls within acceptable bounds before proceeding with subsequent memory operations. This lack of rigorous boundary checking allows an attacker to inject malformed data that bypasses standard validation routines, leading directly to unsafe memory access patterns during the parsing process.
When a crafted PLY file is processed by this vulnerable version of RPly, the execution flow diverges based on whether the input format is ASCII or binary. In the case of ASCII parsing, the improper index validation triggers an out-of-bounds handler within the ply_read_list_property function. This typically results in a denial of service condition where the application crashes due to an unhandled exception or segmentation fault caused by accessing invalid memory addresses associated with the malformed list structure. For binary PLY files, the consequences are significantly more severe. The lack of validation allows for potential heap corruption as the parser attempts to read data based on maliciously crafted length values that exceed allocated buffer sizes. This can lead to arbitrary code execution if an attacker carefully crafts the payload to overwrite function pointers or control flow structures in memory, exploiting the resulting instability to gain unauthorized access to the system running the vulnerable application.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-125, Out-of-bounds Read, as it involves accessing memory beyond the intended boundaries of an array or buffer due to insufficient validation of input data indices. Furthermore, in the context of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this flaw facilitates initial access and execution techniques by allowing attackers to leverage malformed files for denial of service attacks against services that process PLY inputs, such as 3D modeling software viewers, game engines, or scientific visualization tools. The impact extends beyond simple application crashes; in server-side contexts where automated processing of uploaded assets occurs, this vulnerability could be weaponized to disrupt critical infrastructure or serve as a vector for more complex exploitation chains targeting the underlying operating system and runtime environment.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate updates to RPly version 1.1.4 or later, which addresses these validation gaps by implementing strict bounds checking on all array indices derived from file headers. Developers integrating this library should also enforce input sanitization at the application level before passing data to parsing functions. This includes validating that list lengths and type identifiers conform to expected ranges based on the PLY specification standards. Additionally, employing memory-safe programming practices such as Address Sanitizers during development can help detect similar out-of-bounds access issues early in the software lifecycle. For organizations relying on this library for processing untrusted 3D assets, implementing sandboxing mechanisms or using dedicated virtual environments to isolate parsing processes from critical system resources is recommended to limit the blast radius of any potential exploitation attempts.