CVE-2026-46652 in goobi-viewer-core
Summary
by MITRE • 10/23/2026
The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. From version 24.03 to before version 26.05, ExternalFilesDownloader.getFilename() extracts the destination filename from a server-supplied Content-Disposition response header and passes it directly to Path.resolve() without stripping directory components. This allows for a malicious HTTP server that the viewer fetches from to supply an absolute path or ../ traversal sequences as the filename, writing attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary path writable by the Tomcat process. When targeting the deployed web-application directory, this yields remote code execution as the tomcat OS user. This issue has been patched in version 26.05.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/23/2026
The Goobi viewer is a widely used web application designed to display digitized materials within a browser environment. In versions ranging from 24.03 up to, but not including, version 26.05, the software contains a critical path traversal vulnerability located in the ExternalFilesDownloader component. Specifically, the getFilename() method is responsible for extracting the destination filename from the Content-Disposition header of an HTTP response received from external servers. This functionality allows users or systems to fetch files that are then stored locally by the application. However, the implementation fails to properly sanitize the extracted filename before using it in file system operations.
The technical flaw lies in how the extracted filename is processed. The method passes the raw value directly to Java's Path.resolve() function without stripping directory components such as absolute path indicators or relative traversal sequences like dot-dot-slash. This lack of validation means that if a malicious HTTP server supplies a Content-Disposition header with a filename containing ../ sequences or an absolute path, the application will interpret these literally rather than treating them as simple file names. Consequently, when the application attempts to write the fetched content to disk, it does not confine the output to the intended directory structure.
This vulnerability leads to arbitrary file write capabilities for any attacker who can control the Content-Disposition header of a server that the Goobi viewer is configured to fetch from. By supplying carefully crafted traversal sequences, an attacker can direct the application to overwrite files in directories writable by the Tomcat process user account. This capability significantly escalates the impact beyond simple data corruption or information disclosure. If the attacker targets specific executable locations within the deployed web-application directory, such as replacing a JAR file or deploying a malicious servlet, they can achieve remote code execution under the context of the tomcat operating system user.
The operational impact is severe, particularly in environments where the Tomcat process runs with elevated privileges or has write access to critical application directories. Successful exploitation allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the host machine, potentially leading to full system compromise. This aligns with CWE-22, which describes Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, commonly known as path traversal. Furthermore, this vulnerability facilitates lateral movement and persistence within the network infrastructure once initial access is gained through file upload or replacement techniques described in MITRE ATT&CK tactics such as Initial Access via Web Application Exploitation and Persistence via File Manipulation.
Mitigation strategies primarily involve upgrading to version 26.05 or later, where this issue has been patched by implementing proper input validation and sanitization of the filename extracted from HTTP headers. In cases where immediate patching is not feasible, administrators should restrict the permissions of the Tomcat process user to minimize write access to only necessary directories. Additionally, configuring reverse proxies to sanitize Content-Disposition headers before they reach the application can provide an additional layer of defense against this type of attack vector. Regular security audits and static code analysis tools that detect improper path resolution practices are also recommended to prevent similar vulnerabilities in future development cycles.