CVE-2026-129139 in paicoding
Summary
by MITRE • 11/13/2026
paicoding from commit b8206b9 through commit 903adce uses predictable credentials for accounts created via ZSXQ login, because loginByZsxq derives both the username and password solely from the member's ZSXQ number. Unauthenticated attackers can read that number from the victim's /user/{userId} profile page, compute the credentials, and log in via /login/username to take over the account.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/13/2026
The vulnerability identified within paicoding versions spanning commit b8206b9 through 903adce represents a critical failure in authentication logic driven by predictable credential generation mechanisms. This flaw is specifically tied to accounts created or managed via the ZSXQ login integration, where the system derives both the username and password exclusively from the member's unique ZSXQ number. By relying on this single identifier as the sole source for authentication credentials without introducing additional entropy or secure randomization, the application creates a deterministic relationship between public profile data and private access keys. This architectural decision fundamentally undermines the security model of the authentication subsystem, allowing any individual with knowledge of the victim's identity to reconstruct valid login parameters.
From a technical perspective, the core issue lies in the implementation of the loginByZsxq function which lacks proper cryptographic practices for credential derivation. Instead of generating random passwords or utilizing secure hashing algorithms that incorporate salt values independent of user-provided identifiers, the system maps the ZSXQ number directly to both username and password fields. This design choice means that if an attacker can ascertain a victim's ZSXQ number, they can algorithmically reproduce the exact credentials used by the application for authentication purposes. The predictability is absolute because there are no additional variables such as timestamps, random salts, or user-defined secrets involved in the generation process, making the output deterministic and easily computable given only the input identifier.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its unauthenticated nature and ease of exploitation. Attackers do not need valid credentials initially; they can obtain the necessary ZSXQ number by accessing the victim's public profile page located at /user/{userId}. This endpoint typically exposes user identifiers for social or administrative purposes, making it a low-barrier entry point for reconnaissance. Once the attacker retrieves this identifier from the web interface, they apply the known derivation logic to compute the corresponding username and password. With these credentials in hand, the attacker can then authenticate via the /login/username endpoint, effectively taking full control of the victim's account without triggering any anomaly detection systems that might look for brute-force patterns or invalid login attempts.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-798 which describes the use of hard-coded or predictable default credentials, as well as CWE-640 regarding weak password verification mechanisms where passwords are derived from easily guessable inputs. In terms of offensive security frameworks such as MITRE ATT&CK, this behavior facilitates Account Manipulation and Credential Access techniques, specifically allowing an adversary to bypass authentication controls through credential stuffing based on publicly available information. The lack of multi-factor authentication or secondary validation steps exacerbates the risk, as there is no additional layer to verify the identity of the user attempting to log in with these predicted credentials.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate remediation efforts should focus on decoupling account identifiers from authentication secrets. Developers must implement a robust password generation strategy that utilizes cryptographically secure random number generators to create passwords independent of any user-provided data such as ZSXQ numbers or usernames. Additionally, implementing multi-factor authentication would significantly reduce the impact of compromised credentials by requiring a second form of verification beyond knowledge-based factors. It is also advisable to review all profile endpoints for excessive information disclosure and ensure that sensitive identifiers are not exposed in publicly accessible URLs unless strictly necessary for application functionality. Regular security audits focusing on authentication logic should be conducted to prevent similar predictable credential generation patterns from being introduced into other parts of the system.