CVE-2026-130595 in SQLBot
Summary
by MITRE • 11/17/2026
SQLBot 1.10.0 through 1.10.3 fails to apply its PostgreSQL dangerous-function denylist because DS_SPECIFIC_DANGEROUS_FUNCTIONS uses 'postgresql' while lookups use the 'pg' type. Authenticated users can steer LLM-generated SQL past check_sql_read() using pg_read_file, pg_write_file, lo_import or lo_export to read or write files on the database host.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/17/2026
SQLBot versions 1.10.0 through 1.10.3 contain a critical configuration mismatch vulnerability that undermines its security controls for Large Language Model generated SQL queries. The application is designed to prevent dangerous PostgreSQL functions from being executed by LLMs, which are often used to generate dynamic database interactions. However, the denylist mechanism relies on a specific variable named DS_SPECIFIC_DANGEROUS_FUNCTIONS, which incorrectly uses the string 'postgresql' as its identifier for type matching. In contrast, the internal lookup logic that processes incoming queries utilizes the abbreviated type identifier 'pg'. This discrepancy means that when an authenticated user submits a query containing dangerous functions such as pg_read_file, pg_write_file, lo_import, or lo_export, the system fails to recognize these commands as prohibited because the type identifiers do not match. Consequently, the check_sql_read() function does not trigger its protective filters, allowing the malicious SQL statements to execute directly against the database engine without interception.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, granting authenticated users the ability to read and write arbitrary files on the host machine where the PostgreSQL database server resides. Functions like pg_read_file allow an attacker to access sensitive configuration files, source code, or other data stored in accessible directories, leading to a significant confidentiality breach. Conversely, functions such as pg_write_file, lo_import, and lo_export enable attackers to overwrite existing system files or create new ones with arbitrary content. This capability can lead to complete host compromise if the database process runs with sufficient privileges, potentially allowing for remote code execution, persistence mechanisms via web shells, or further lateral movement within the network infrastructure. The vulnerability effectively bypasses a key defense-in-depth layer intended to restrict LLM capabilities to safe database operations only.
From a classification perspective, this issue aligns with CWE-20 Improper Input Validation and CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials if the configuration is considered static misconfiguration rather than dynamic input failure. It also relates to CWE-611 Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference in broader contexts of untrusted data handling, though specifically here it represents a logic error in type checking. In terms of MITRE ATT&CK techniques, this vulnerability facilitates T1083 File and Directory Discovery for reading files and T1564 Host Obfuscation or T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter if the written files are executed. The attack vector is primarily remote but requires authentication, placing it within the scope of authenticated attacks that exploit application logic flaws rather than network protocol vulnerabilities.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate action must be taken to correct the configuration mismatch in SQLBot settings. Administrators should update the DS_SPECIFIC_DANGEROUS_FUNCTIONS variable to use 'pg' instead of 'postgresql', ensuring consistency with the internal lookup mechanism. Alternatively, upgrading to a patched version of SQLBot that resolves this identifier discrepancy is recommended if available. In addition to fixing the code or configuration, organizations should enforce strict least-privilege principles for database service accounts, ensuring they do not have file system write permissions unless absolutely necessary. Monitoring and logging mechanisms should be enhanced to detect attempts to use dangerous PostgreSQL functions like pg_read_file or lo_export, providing an additional layer of defense even if application-level controls fail. Regular security audits of LLM integration points are essential to identify similar logic errors in other systems that rely on type-based filtering for safety constraints.