CVE-2026-130615 in Flowiseinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/17/2026

Flowise through 3.1.4 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated users to reach internal services by exploiting unpinned DNS validation in checkDenyList(). Attackers can configure a chatflow with Playwright or Puppeteer loaders using a DNS-rebinding domain so headless Chromium fetches internal or cloud metadata endpoints, returning responses as document content.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/17/2026

The vulnerability identified in Flowise versions prior to 3.1.4 represents a critical server-side request forgery flaw rooted in the improper validation of Uniform Resource Locators during chatflow configuration. Specifically, the checkDenyList function fails to enforce strict DNS pinning or IP address verification when processing URLs loaded via Playwright or Puppeteer integrations. This architectural oversight allows an authenticated user to manipulate the target destination of server-side HTTP requests by leveraging a domain that resolves to different IP addresses over time, a technique known as DNS rebinding. By configuring a chatflow with these specific loaders and pointing them toward a maliciously controlled domain, attackers can bypass initial security checks that rely solely on static hostname validation rather than persistent connection verification.

The operational mechanism of this exploit relies heavily on the behavior of headless Chromium instances used by Playwright and Puppeteer to render web content. When the server initiates a request through these tools, it typically resolves the domain name at the start of the operation. However, if an attacker controls a DNS zone with a very low Time-to-Live value, they can change the IP address associated with that domain between the initial validation check and the actual network connection attempt. This timing window allows the server to believe it is communicating with a safe or allowed host during the deny list evaluation, while the headless browser ultimately connects to an internal service or cloud metadata endpoint. The vulnerability effectively transforms the application into a proxy for accessing resources that are otherwise restricted from external access due to firewall rules or network segmentation policies.

The impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data exfiltration within the local network environment. Attackers can target internal microservices, databases, and management interfaces that are not exposed to the public internet but remain accessible via private IP ranges such as 10.x.x.x, 172.16.x.x, or 192.168.x.x. Furthermore, in cloud-native deployments, this flaw enables access to instance metadata services like AWS EC2 Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) or Azure Managed Identity endpoints. By fetching these sensitive configuration files and credentials through the browser's document content response mechanism, attackers can compromise the underlying infrastructure, escalate privileges within the application environment, and potentially achieve full control over cloud resources associated with the compromised account.

This vulnerability aligns closely with Common Weakness Enumeration CWE-918, which describes Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaws where server-side code makes requests to user-supplied URLs without sufficient validation of the destination address. Additionally, it maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1557, specifically Adversary-in-the-Middle or Lateral Tool Transfer variants that utilize SSRF for network reconnaissance and credential theft. The use of DNS rebinding places this exploit within the context of T1048, Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol, as data is exfiltrated through standard web traffic patterns disguised as legitimate document retrieval operations.

Mitigation strategies must prioritize strict input validation and connection verification practices. Organizations should immediately upgrade to Flowise version 3.1.4 or later, where the checkDenyList function has been hardened to prevent DNS rebinding attacks by ensuring that the IP address resolved at request initiation remains consistent throughout the entire transaction lifecycle. For environments unable to patch immediately, implementing network-level controls such as egress filtering can restrict headless browser processes from accessing internal subnets and cloud metadata endpoints. Additionally, deploying a reverse proxy with strict URL validation policies or utilizing specialized SSRF protection modules that verify IP addresses against allowlists before establishing connections provides an essential layer of defense against this class of exploitation.

Responsible

VulnCheck

Reservation

11/17/2026

Disclosure

11/17/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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